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This document is a synthesis of Les aires marines protégées d’Afrique de l’Ouest. 
Gouvernance et politiques publiques (Weigel et. al, 2007) which proposes an analytical 
framework to study the governance of MPAs in the LDCs, drawing on four sources of 
inspiration: (i) the interactive fisheries governance approach; (ii) the risk governance 
approach; (iii) the socioanthropology of mediations and brokerage; and (iv) the governance 
analytical framework. The framework indicates the five issues that must be addressed in 
order to operationalize the concept of governance in LDC MPAs: (i) definition of the 
problem or the issue at stake; (ii) identification of the set of relevant governance norms; 
(iii) presentation of the actors involved in the governance process; (iv) highlighting the 
nodes around which actors’ strategies converge; and (v) recalling the processes that have led 
to the current state of governance. This analytical framework makes it possible to 
characterize the governance system of each of the MPAs considered and to develop a 
typology of these systems. The characterization of different governance systems highlights 
their weaknesses and paves the way for new public policy options and, more generally, for 
the restructuring of governance to correct these weaknesses.
In order to develop an analytical framework and the characterization of governance systems 
the main MPA governance principles and constraints, as well their legal context, were 
clarified. This was done by testing the proposed methodology in three West African coastal 
and marine protected areas, which illustrated the difficulties of governance in LDCs: the 
Banc d’Arguin National Park in Mauritania, the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve in Senegal, 
and the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve in Guinea-Bissau. The analysis of 
demographic and economic constraints in these West African MPAs showed the importance 
of: (i) increasing population density and mobility; (ii) the intensification of resource 
exploitation; and (iii) and the opening of the MPA economy. The analysis of the legal and 
institutional contexts showed the international inspiration of the MPA objectives and 
conservation arrangements, and the syncretism of the legal system. 
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Preparation of this document
This publication was developed within the framework of FAO Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Department initiatives to promote a multidisciplinary reflection 
process on marine protected areas (MPAs) and fisheries management that would 
take into account distinct issues in least-developed countries (LDCs). This work 
drew on the participation of the authors in this framework and at the workshop on 
MPAs and fisheries management held in Rome (12–14 July 2006), in the European 
research project Coherence of Public Policy of Conservation and Development 
of Coastal and Marine Protected Areas in West Africa (CONSDEV), and in the 
project Marine Protected Areas and Fisheries Management through Resource 
and Ecosystem Optimization (aires marines protégées et gestion halieutique par 
optimisation des ressources et des écosystèmes – AMPHORE) of the French 
national research agency (Agence nationale de la recherche, ANR) for which the 
MPA governance analytical framework was developed.
This work is based on empirical evidence and materials relating to cooperation 
arrangements and it reflects the methodology implemented by the various disciplines 
involved. Its successful outcome is the result of the scientific cooperation between 
researchers from the North and the South and between researchers and managers 
from LDCs.
The maps for this publication were provided by Anne Le Fur and Eric Opigez 
of the Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD).
This work is an adaptation of Les aires marines protégées d’Afrique de l’Ouest. 
Gouvernance et politiques publiques, edited by J.Y. Weigel, F. Féral and B. Cazalet, 
originally published in French in 2007.
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Abstract 
The need for effective governance of the marine protected areas (MPAs) in least-
developed countries (LDCs) is commensurate with the significant territorial 
stakes raised by their extensive maritime domain. Another significant challenge 
is the conservation of biodiversity and of ecosystems whose level of productivity 
is similar to that of coral reefs (e.g. in East Africa and Madagascar, the Red Sea, 
Maldives, Cambodia, and South Pacific islands), upwelling systems (e.g. in West 
Africa and Angola) and estuarine and delta ecosystems (e.g. in West and East 
Africa, Bangladesh and Myanmar). However, the overriding issue is to reconcile 
conservation and human presence as, in LDCs, human activities are tolerated in 
almost all MPAs covered by International Union for Conservation of Nature 
categories II–VI. Finally, issues related to identity claims and to the process of 
establishment of property and other legal entitlements on nature are gaining 
importance. 
A review of the literature on fisheries and MPAs governance showed how 
polysemous and vague the notion of governance was until very recently and 
how few or oversimplified were the analyses of MPA governance in the LDCs. 
However, only detailed analyses would allow the characterization of governance 
systems and identification of their weaknesses with the view to suggesting new 
governance arrangements and appropriate public policy options. Such analytical 
deficiencies may be explained by the lack of analytical frameworks capable of 
taking into account the plurality and intricacy of socio-economic organizations 
and institutions, the sociocultural features and the role of new mediators and 
“development brokers” that shape MPA governance in the LDCs. The deficiencies 
may also be explained by the fact that the dominating hierarchical governance 
systems tend to underestimate the complexity of MPA governance systems.
Therefore, it has been necessary to develop an analytical framework to study the 
governance of MPAs in the LDCs, drawing on four sources of inspiration: (i) the 
interactive fisheries governance approach; (ii) the risk governance approach; (iii) the 
socioanthropology of mediations and brokerage; and (iv) the governance analytical 
framework. The framework indicates the five issues that must be addressed in 
order to operationalize the concept of governance in LDC MPAs: (i) definition 
of the problem or the issue at stake; (ii) identification of the set of relevant 
governance norms; (iii) presentation of the actors involved in the governance 
process; (iv) highlighting the nodes around which actors’ strategies converge; and 
(v) recalling the processes that have led to the current state of governance. This 
analytical framework makes it possible to characterize the governance system of 
each of the MPAs considered and to develop a typology of these systems. The 
characterization of different governance systems highlights their weaknesses 
vand paves the way for new public policy options and, more generally, for the 
restructuring of governance to correct these weaknesses.
However, prior to the development of the analytical framework and the 
characterization of governance systems, the main MPA governance principles and 
constraints, as well their legal context, must be clarified. The whole methodology 
was tested on three West African coastal and marine protected areas, which seemed 
to provide textbook cases illustrating the difficulties of governance in LDCs: the 
Banc d’Arguin National Park in Mauritania, the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve 
in Senegal, and the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve in Guinea-
Bissau. The analysis of demographic and economic constraints in these West 
African MPAs showed the importance of: (i) increasing population density and 
mobility; (ii) the intensification of resource exploitation; and (iii) and the opening 
of the MPA economy. The analysis of the legal and institutional contexts showed 
the international inspiration of the MPA objectives and conservation arrangements, 
and the syncretism of the legal system. 
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1. Introduction
Jean-Yves Weigel, François Féral and Bertrand Cazalet
A TOPICAL MATTER 
The concept of governance is increasingly concerned with stakeholder 
representation and participation and with the need to find several explanations to 
the problems affecting fisheries management beyond a sectoral approach (Jentoft, 
2006). A governance approach is different from a management one: the focus 
is not on technical or economic solutions to sociopolitical problems but rather 
on the power relations between actors that determine the application of norms. 
The transterritorial nature of fishing activities, illustrated by the overlap between 
the different fishing territories and itineraries (for example, between a marine 
protected area [MPA] and the adjacent territory) can better be taken into account 
by a governance-based approach that also integrates better the consequences of 
globalization such as the redistribution of value-added and increasing inequalities 
(Weigel and Dahou, 2007).
Some years ago, in proposing a social science research programme applied to 
MPAs and their governance, Christie et al. (2003) already stressed the importance 
of the political, social and economic issues expressed in the concept of governance, 
insisting on the fact that the social and political dimensions needed to be 
adapted to local requirements and specificities (Christie et al., 2003, p. 24). The 
popularization of the concept of governance within the academic world of fisheries 
sciences signalled the end of the natural sciences hegemony and the emergence of 
a multidisciplinary approach, marking the end of an era characterized by “the 
historical difficulty or reluctance to fully integrate social science disciplines into 
operational fishery science” (Garcia and Charles, 2008, p. 16).
The importance of governance in protected areas was explicitly recognized in 
several recommendations from the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (2002) and the World Parks Congress in Durban (2003), including 
one relating to the establishment of a global system of coastal and marine protected 
areas networks that ought to cover 20–30 percent of the maritime surface by 
2012, and another relating to the protection of marine biological diversity and 
ecosystem processes.1 The wording of these recommendations highlights the 
need for coherence between natural resource conservation and socio-economic 
development policies when anything other than a strict nature reserve is being 
considered. These recommendations call for the recognition of and the respect 
for customary property, access and use of local populations. They fit within the 
general trend of recognizing the fundamental role of social, cultural, economic and 
institutional factors in conservation, aiming to increase civil-society involvement 
in the decision-making process.
1 Respectively, recommendations 22 and 23 (cf. www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/wpc2003/).
Governance of marine protected areas in least-developed countries – Case studies from West Africa2
THE MPA-RELATED STAKES IN LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The need for adequate governance of MPAs in least-developed countries (LDCs)2 
is commensurate with the importance of the territorial stakes in their extended 
maritime domain. A significant part of this domain is already officially protected, 
as no fewer than 207 marine areas cover more than 563 000 km2 with an average 
area of 2 720 km2. The LDC MPAs are characterized by a wide variety of sizes 
ranging from the largest MPA in the world (Phoenix Islands in Kiribati) to some 
of the smallest, found in Maldives and Solomon Islands3 (Map 1).
Other important challenges are those of biodiversity and ecosystem conservation. 
The first is related to the rich diversity of the fauna – especially the aquatic fauna – 
2 The term “least-developed countries (LDCs)” describes the world’s poorest countries with 
the following three criteria: (i) low income based on a three-year average estimate of the gross 
national income per capita (under US$570 for inclusion, above US$900 for graduation); (ii) poor 
level of development of the human capital based on the Human Assets Index using four criteria 
(nutrition, health, education and adult literacy); and (iii) economic vulnerability with Environmental 
Vulnerability Indicators reflecting the instability of agricultural production, the instability of 
exports of goods and services, the economic importance of non-traditional activities (share of 
manufacturing and modern services in gross domestic product), merchandise export concentration, 
and the handicap of economic smallness.
3 Sources: World Database on Protected Areas (www.wdpa.org) and MPA Global (www.mpaglobal.org).
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MAP 1 
Total area and number of marine protected areas in least-developed countries
Sources: MPA Global Database; WDPA Database; PRCM.
Note: The representation in this map (and the proceeding maps) predates 
the recent UN General Assembly decision to admit South Sudan as a new 
recognized State (see Resolution 1999 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council 
at its 6582nd meeting, on 13 July 2011
3Introduction
in these protected areas. The richness of this aquatic fauna is expressed by the 
presence of emblematic species among the large number of marine and estuarine 
species identified (more than 700 in West African MPAs). Such diversity is similar 
to that of coral reefs (e.g. in East Africa and Madagascar, Red Sea, Maldives, 
Cambodia, South Pacific islands), upwelling areas (e.g. in West Africa and Angola) 
and estuarine and delta ecosystems (e.g. in West and East Africa, Bangladesh and 
Myanmar). These MPAs also host an avian fauna with huge concentrations of 
palearctic waders (Charadrii) as well as endemic species, all of which thrive on 
the productivity of the mudflats and mangroves. The flora in LDC coastal and 
marine protected areas is also very rich. The most remarkable features are: (i) the 
large mangrove forests or wetland forests, such as the Sundarbans in Bangladesh, 
the mangroves of Rio Cacheu, Guinea-Bissau; the forest reserves in the United 
Republic of Tanzania, the mangrove natural reserve in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo; (ii) the remnants of subhumid forests (in the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago 
Biosphere Reserve in Guinea-Bissau; the Botum Sakor in Cambodia); and (iii) 
some agroforestry features, as in Vanuatu. The issues at stake for biodiversity and 
ecosystems in LDC coastal and marine protected areas are related to the threats 
they face: climate change (warming, sea-level rise) and human pressure (population 
densification and resource overexploitation).
However, the overriding issue is that of reconciling conservation and human 
presence because human activities are tolerated in almost all LDC MPAs. Only 
three of them (South Maskali Island in Djibouti, Cap Blanc in Mauritania and 
Lampi Marine National Park in Myanmar) fall within International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) category I (strict nature reserve or wilderness 
area without permanent or significant habitation),4 which means that almost all 
LDC MPAs would fit under the IUCN MPA categories II–VI. The latter are 
also characterized by a variety of denominations.5 Noting that a single country 
can have several MPA denominations, the most common ones found in the 
database cited above are those of “national park” and “marine park” (dominant in 
Angola, Cambodia, the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Samoa, Senegal, the Sudan and Yemen), 
followed by “marine reserve” or “nature reserve” or “conservation reserve” 
(the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu), “forest reserve” or “forest conservation area” (mangroves 
of the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu), “wildlife sanctuary” or “game 
reserve” (Bangladesh, Kiribati, Myanmar and Somalia), “wetlands of international 
importance” (Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo), 
dive sites (Maldives), or simply by the recent “MPA” denomination’ (Senegal, 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu). The number of MPAs increases every year mainly 
because of the multiplication of community-based protected areas, in particular in 
the South Pacific and, to a lesser extent, in West Africa.
4 See note 3.
5 The status in the cited areas takes into account several criteria from law, management, and international 
labelling. No MPA has been reported in these areas in Haiti, the only LDC in America.
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Finally, when trying to reconcile conservation and human presence, issues 
related to cultural identity are growing in importance owing to the emphasis placed 
on the crucial role of some local practices in nature conservation, for example the 
establishment of fishing reserves , and their potential involvement in local and 
environmental governance. Going hand-in-hand with identity claims, the claims 
relating to the establishment of property and other legal entitlements on nature6 
can only be clarified by an identification of the inheritance of natural objects 
(e.g. land, water, fishing grounds), practices and knowledge. Identity assertion 
and traditional legal entitlement issues raise the question of an appropriate 
“indigenous” status as this is an argument often put forward to justify the closure 
of a territory and the exclusive appropriation of resources by MPA residents7 or 
by the communities residing at its periphery.
FISHERIES AND MPA GOVERNANCE: EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT
A review of the fisheries literature shows how polysemic and vague the notion 
of governance has been until recently. Hence, Townsend (1995) argues in terms 
of fisheries self-governance analysing the respective benefits of corporate and 
cooperative governance structures. Symes and Phillipson (1999) prefer the 
term “co-governance” and stress the need for an integrated system combining 
privatization and regionalization. Hanna (1997) addresses the sustainability of 
fisheries governance and emphasizes the need to develop institutional capital. 
Garcia and Hayashi (2000) also consider governance sustainability and its spatial 
dimension. Wilson, Raakjær Nielsen and Degnbol (2003) hint at the notion of 
fisheries governance but prefer comanagement whose efficiency depends on 
improved stakeholder representation and civil society involvement. The notion of 
comanagement is also considered by Jentoft (2005), who examines the condition 
for its sustainability, which is the empowerment of individuals and communities. 
Research by Gray (2005a, 2005b) focuses on participatory governance. Grafton 
(2005) combines fisheries governance and social capital, and emphasizes the issue of 
trust and cooperation. Grafton et al. (2008) emphasize better governance conditions 
in a changing world. Cole (2003) revisits the theme of international fisheries 
governance. Chakallah et al. (2007) concentrate on the institutional arrangements 
required for transboundary marine resource governance. Gibbs (2008) underlines 
the need for, and the consequences of, a fisheries governance network. This notion 
of network is promoted by a few researchers and managers working on MPA 
governance (Gladstone, Krupp and Younis, 2003; WCPA/IUCN, 2007).
6 The French term for this process is “patrimonialisation”.
7 The population using the MPA includes residents non-residents and offshore immigrants. Residents 
are the long-term (traditional) settlers in the area. They have the legal status of “residents” and 
territorial claims over the resources. They may emigrate out of the MPA for periods of time, 
maintaining however their “resident” status. They also migrate seasonally within the MPA to 
ascertain their territorial claims. Non-residents do not have the same origin and rights as the residents. 
Some settled in the MPA long ago while others settle only seasonally (seasonal immigrants), in more 
or less seasonal camps. Offshore immigrants are not MPA dwellers (outsiders). They live close to the 
MPA and fish outside and inside it with little or no connection to the MPA land.
5Introduction
This polysemic nature of the notion of governance and the fuzziness 
accompanying it can be explained by the fact that most fisheries scientists focus 
on the role of MPAs in global governance of marine areas rather than on the 
content and modalities of governance itself. Relationships between protected 
area governance, on the one hand, and integrated management of coastal zones 
or ocean governance, on the other hand, are given priority. Thus, Ehler (2005) 
suggested a collective reflection on these relationships and set out principles and 
ways to implement this integration. Cicin-Sain and Belfiore (2005) reviewed the 
ecological, social and economic links between MPAs and ocean governance, and 
suggested a series of guidelines for this integration. Chronologically, governance 
and MPAs were first associated with the broader framework of coastal zone 
governance (Halim and Morcos, 1995; Cho, 2005), then in the even broader 
framework of ocean governance (Eichbaum and Agardy, 1995; Costanza et al., 
1999). More recently, MPAs have been associated to the large marine ecosystems 
management framework (National Research Council, 2001; Juda and Hennessey, 
2005; Hennessey and Sutinen, 2005; Fanning et al., 2007; Mahon, Fanning and 
McConney, 2008). At the same time, and following in the footsteps of FAO (2003, 
2007), some authors have associated MPAs and governance to the ecosystem-
based fisheries management framework (Christie and White, 2007; Pomeroy and 
Viswanathan, 2003; Carter, 2003; Pomeroy, Mascia and Pollnac, 2007; Charles and 
Sanders, 2007).
However, in the last few years, the imprecision in the notion of governance 
has been eliminated in the context of recognition of the multifunctional role of 
MPAs and the achievements of interactive fisheries governance (Kooiman et al., 
2005).8 The recognition of the multifunctional role of MPAs, which illustrates 
the evolution from a conservationist to a sustainable development approach, 
has contributed to focusing research effort on the integration of societal needs 
and on governance content (Noël and Weigel, 2007). The work on interactive 
fisheries governance, inspired by work on modern governance (Kooiman, 1993; 
Rhodes, 1996) led to a definition: “The whole of interactions taken to solve 
societal problems and to create societal opportunities; including the formulation 
and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions 
that enable and control them” (Kooiman et al., 2005, p. 17). This definition can be 
applied to MPA governance insofar as the constraints on governance are similar: 
the diversity of fisheries systems and ecosystems; the complexity of human 
activities (within the fisheries value chain, between fisheries and non-fisheries 
activities) and of the ecosystem (variability and unpredictability); the dynamics of 
ecosystems, of markets, of the social, cultural and political environment; and the 
multiple temporal and spatial scales of activities (Kooiman et al., 2005).
Three research breakthroughs have helped to clarify the notion of governance. 
The first, in the wake of works on interactive fisheries governance, is the systemic 
analysis of MPA governance that presents it as a relationship between two systems: 
8 For Kooiman et al. (2005, p. 19), governance is neither top-down not bottom-up but is related to the 
totality of the interactions between those governing and those governed – it is itself an interaction.
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The first system combines management institutions and mechanisms. The second 
system consists of an ecological element (an ecosystem and the resources it hosts) 
and a social element encompassing users and stakeholders forming coalitions 
(Jentoft, van Son and Bjørkan, 2007).
The second breakthrough is in highlighting the importance of the local 
governance conditions: First, the geographical proximity of those who govern and 
those who are governed in an identified, delimited space (the MPA) has a social 
dimension (Talbot, 2006). Second, there is the institutional proximity created 
by the decentralization and deconcentration9 of public administrations, which 
requires maintaining coherence between local and regional levels (Portman, 2007) 
and controlling transaction costs (Chaboud and Galletti, 2007). Finally, there is the 
organizational proximity that promotes deliberative practices towards achieving 
common objectives as well as collective compromises between diverging interests 
(Boncoeur et al., 2007). 
The third breakthrough is the identification of governance indicators used 
to measure the achievement of pre-established objectives (Abrams et al., 2003; 
Pomeroy, Parks and Watson, 2004; Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, 2006; Heylings 
and Bravo, 2007). However, the normative and prescriptive approach underlying 
the use of indicators does not remove the need for an analytical framework in 
which governance is considered as a social fact and not as an end in itself (Hufty, 
2007).
THE NEED FOR AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF MPA GOVERNANCE
However, despite such progress, a review of the literature on MPA governance 
showed that, in LDCs, detailed analyses of their governance were rare and 
practically non-existent (Weigel et al., 2008). However, only detailed analyses 
make it possible to characterize the governance system of an MPA (or a network 
of MPAs), to evaluate it against its stated objectives and its deficiencies, and finally 
to suggest new governance systems and appropriate public policy options. Such 
shortcomings can first be explained by the complexity of governance systems in 
LDCs, and the diversity and intertwining of social and institutional organizations: 
9 Decentralization reflects the recognition (often an institutional one) of a proper sphere of 
competence (e.g. in a district or commune) by the central power (i.e. the State). The decentralized 
institution is hierarchically and functionally autonomous (self-governing). The State cannot interfere 
with its functioning except to dissolve it in serious circumstances, and to organize new elections. In 
a decentralized mode, the State “lets other selected autonomous institutions do its job”.
 Deconcentration implies a delegation by the State or a centralized institution of the State (e.g. a 
ministry) to one of its lower-level representative institutions (e.g. a regional or local division of that 
ministry) of the responsibility to implement the State policy or a specific part of it. A deconcentrated 
institution has no policy of its own. It implements the State’s policy. It is the State’s conveyor belt 
of the central policy.
 Decentralized institutions (with locally elected staff serving a locally adopted policy) and 
deconcentrated institutions (with State-nominated staff, implementing State policy) may cohabit in 
the same area (e.g. a regional assembly). The mayor of a municipality may be both a decentralized 
authority (when implementing the town council’s policy and budget) and a deconcentrated authority 
(maintaining social peace and public order, or when marrying people in the name of the State).
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multiple actors (clanic, tribal, lineage and customary hierarchies; development 
brokers); specific sociocultural or legal standards (cosmogony, legal syncretism) 
and nodal points (council of elders, jamâ a). They can also be explained by the fact 
that the systemic analysis of MPA governance and the work on local governance 
or on governance indicators does not easily convey this complexity. Finally, these 
shortcomings could be explained by the dominance of normative hierarchical 
frameworks (not in line with good governance principles) that underestimate the 
complexity of MPAs governance, the need for a diversity of benchmarks and the 
difficulties in reaching consensus. 
A methodology developed by researchers from the Institut universitaire 
d’études du développement (IUED – University Institute for Development 
Studies) partially mitigates these deficiencies in proposing a governance analytical 
framework intended to provide the foundation for a comparative and generalizable 
approach. Applied to MPAs, this methodology (combined with an approach based 
on interactive fisheries governance, risk governance and socioanthropology of 
mediations and brokerage) enables the development of an analytical framework 
for the governance of LDC MPAs that captures the complexity of interactions 
stemming from multiple and intertwined social and institutional organizations, 
the sociocultural characteristics affecting the formulation of norms, and the 
emergence of development brokers. This integration of new theoretical and 
methodological benchmarks marks a shift from environmental or fisheries science 
towards political science and developmental socioanthropology.
This analytical framework makes it possible to characterize the governance 
system for each MPA and to develop a typology of governance systems. The 
characterization of different governance systems highlights their weaknesses and 
paves the way for public policy options and, more generally, for the restructuring 
of governance to alleviate these weaknesses. The methodology was tested on three 
West African coastal MPAs that seemed to provide textbook cases to illustrate the 
difficulties of characterizing governance in LDCs. Features of these areas are the 
complexity of their social and institutional organizations and the strong human 
pressure that make appropriate governance particularly difficult to implement; 
they cover 27 000 km2 for 170 000 inhabitants. The three MPAs are: the Banc 
d’Arguin National Park (in Mauritania), the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve 
(in Senegal), and the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve (in Guinea-
Bissau) (Map 2).
However, the elaboration of an analytical framework and characterization 
of the governance systems required, first, the highlighting of demographic and 
economic constraints, followed by the legal context of MPA governance in the 
LDCs. More precisely, in the West African context, the following constraints had 
to be analysed: increasing density and growing mobility of human populations; 
intensified resource exploitation; globalization of the economies of MPAs; 
international inspiration of objectives and protection procedures; and syncretism 
of the legal system. 
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THE AIM OF THIS PUBLICATION
This publication aims to present the result of a collective reflection process 
by social science researchers on an operational analytical framework for the 
governance of LDC coastal and marine protected areas, to characterize governance 
systems and to suggest appropriate public policy options. It is aimed at researchers 
and managers and was developed within the framework of FAO Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Department initiatives to promote a multidisciplinary reflection 
process on MPAs and fisheries management that would take into account LDC 
specificities. 
The work reflects the wealth of empirical evidence and materials actively 
collected through cooperative arrangements, the breadth of the disciplines invited 
to contribute, and the analytical framework used. It is the scientific cooperation 
between researchers of the North and of the South and between researchers 
and managers of LDCs that has allowed the successful conduct of the reflection 
process. The disciplines involved include: law and political science, history and 
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sociology, economics and geography, ecology and statistics. The material was 
collected in four phases: (i) a bibliographical phase; (ii) a fieldwork phase in 
the form of a sample-based survey and village-based monographs, and research 
on the legal and regulatory framework;10 (iii) a processing phase of surveys 
focused on the decision-making process, access and resource-use regulations, 
administrative and institutional processes, the creation and application of norms, 
and the demographic and economic situations; and (iv) an analytical phase, 
which generated the structure of this publication, covering issues related to MPA 
governance in LDCs, demographic and economic constraints on governance, the 
legal context, the analytical framework and the characterization of governance 
systems, and the restructuring of governance and public policies.
10 Within the framework of the CONSDEV project, 75 habitat sites and 790 and 783 natural resource 
users were surveyed, 24 village monographies were produced; for sampling strategy and survey 
method used, please refer to Morand (2003) for data entry, Weigel et al. (2004) for data exploitation 
and CONSDEV (2003) for the statistics. Within the framework of the project Marine Protected 
Areas and Fisheries Management by Resource and Ecosystem Optimization (AMPHORE): 
39 questionnaires including 85 percent of (village or sector) stakeholder representatives distributed 
across 14 villages on the perimeter of Bambourg community-based MPA included in the Saloum 
Delta Biosphere Reserve (Weigel, Schmitz and Fontenelle, 2009), 32 questionnaires including 
70 percent of identified (village or sector) stakeholder representatives distributed across 8 villages in 
the Banc D’Arguin National Park (Weigel et al., 2009).
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2. Marine protected area 
governance issues in the  
least-developed countries
François Féral and Bertrand Cazalet
Many examples show that the objectives assigned to MPAs can be ambiguous, even 
conflicting. Protected areas are often presented in LDCs as contributing to the 
conservation of nature and biodiversity and as a tool to overcome underdevelopment. 
For many years, this ambiguity had no impact on their legitimacy. However, today, 
the opportuneness and utility of conservation activities face some resistance and 
are being called into question. Misalignments between rhetorics, institutional 
practices and management strategies also raise new questions. This new context 
calls into question the institutional legitimacy of MPAs as it developed in the 1960s. 
Therefore, one of the first issues for MPA governance in LDCs is the clarification 
of the objectives assigned to them.
The protected area is not an end in itself but a public policy instrument. It 
brings significant social changes and is embedded in a particular institutional and 
social fabric. From a legal and institutional point of view, the protected area project 
consists in defining a territory with a particular status; it is explicitly indicated that 
the decision to do so, often centralized, is adopted looking to a project of general 
national and perhaps even international interest. In LDCs, these policies focus on 
rural areas where the populations are highly dependent on natural resources. The 
combination, or even the confrontation, of nature conservation and development 
policies (e.g. infrastructure, education, trade, health services, and communications) 
is not without many problems.
Therefore, a more realistic conception of MPAs must be advanced for more 
efficient governance – it requires synergy between development and conservation. 
By seeking the well-being of the populations involved as much as biodiversity 
conservation, the adhesion of the communities concerned by the project can be 
obtained. Their support is conditioned by the fact that, through the convergence 
between the conservation project and their own culture, local actors must be 
the first beneficiaries from the development policy. Such projects should not 
be undertaken in parallel with the development policy as if it were completely 
alien. Thus, synergy between conservation and socio-economic development is a 
fundamental issue in LDC MPA governance.
PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATION OF OBJECTIVES
A succession of ambiguous objectives
The specialist MPA literature distinguishes three main types of objective. The first 
is biodiversity conservation. Its positive impact is supposed to occur through: (i) a 
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“reserve effect”, subdivided into a “refuge effect” and a “buffer effect”; or (ii) a 
“spill-over effect” resulting in more abundant populations outside the protected 
area. The second objective is fisheries sustainability. The expected benefits are an 
increase in exploitable biomass and catches together with reduced uncertainty. 
The third objective is the promotion of non-extractive activities such as recreation 
and tourism, which allow economic value to be built on conservation benefits 
(Alban, 2003). Empirical evidence derived from numerous studies shows that the 
confusion between these objectives is more frequent and more significant in LDCs 
where an ongoing shift can be observed from natural resources and biodiversity 
conservation approach to a socio-economic development approach.
Another ambiguity in objectives is that the MPA is sometimes presented 
as a framework for sustainable development. The protected area would be a 
political action framework whose aim would not only be to contribute to species 
and biotope conservation but also to institutionalize a new type of ecological 
governance towards sustainable development.
Therefore, in order to assess the legitimacy of an MPA and the effectiveness of 
its governance, it is essential to clarify its objectives. Only then will it be possible to 
decide if the available management resources are appropriate and efficient in case a 
resistance to the creation of MPAs develops owing to the resulting upheaval in the 
livelihood, incomes and traditions of the poorest and most vulnerable populations. 
In LDCs, the assurance that resident human populations are not adversely affected 
is required more than elsewhere given the importance of their access to natural 
resources, which are often their main source of income. Looking for more efficient 
governance in LDC MPAs, the clarification of objectives brings to the forefront 
the importance of the goal of achieving synergy between the conservation project 
and socio-economic development. Emphasis should be placed on the conditions 
of this synergy that would lead to an appropriation of the conservation project by 
the resident – and adjacent – populations. 
New questions and disagreements
For the last five decades, the formal establishment of protected areas has proceeded 
without too many difficulties. However, this was often done using a centralized 
and unilateral process. The MPAs were generally established at the request of the 
international community following lobbying by the scientific community (which 
can be seen as the mediator and sponsor of the conservation project). In LDCs, it 
is quite possible that the populations and public policy-makers involved did not 
fully realize the scope and the content of the measures accompanying the creation 
of these administrative circumscriptions called MPAs. Today, in LDCs, it is more 
difficult to impose on the various actors a protection coming down from the top, 
given the often difficult relationship between civil society and the State apparatus.
The creation of protected areas is now a long and drawn-out process that 
generates greater and greater opposition from populations and some actors. 
Furthermore, the populations involved still do not really understand the meaning 
and scope of zoning and protection operations. The MPAs may sometimes result 
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in upheavals in the livelihoods, incomes and traditions of the poorest, most 
vulnerable and forgotten populations on the planet, while perverse effects such 
as poaching and seasonal migrations can destabilize societies. As shown below, 
the effective implementation of protection measures raises logistic and political 
difficulties.
A gap between the institutional statement and the intentions of actors 
Often, the dominant discourse is that the MPA is established in the interest of the 
populations who live in it, some even speak of a “real chance” for the indigenous 
people. However, the surveys carried out in West Africa by the authors of this 
case study show that those most concerned are not necessarily convinced by these 
arguments and are unaware of the scope and the meaning of these operations. 
Motivations differ among actors involved. Fishers, traders and artisans, tourism 
operators, central authorities, local dignitaries and associations for nature 
conservation do not have the same perception of the operation (CONSDEV, 
2003).
There is a contradiction between the positive portrayal of the conservation 
operation and the resulting changes in habits, traditions and lifestyles of the 
interested parties. Moreover, the sudden intrusion of technical and scientific 
assistance and the constitution of a parallel administration can raise the concerns 
of officials and fuel the greed of the most opportunistic actors. Changing power 
relationships can be a significant issue for village chiefs, mayors and deconcentrated 
administrations. Who is to decide and how are they to decide about the future of 
the village, the family and the business? What will the rules be?
Decentralized or civil-society institutions are not more problem-free than 
centralized ones: The bureaucratic phenomena are then replaced by the development 
of administrations that are remote from national policies. These programmes and 
interventions can even be perceived as being outside of the usual political field, 
implementing actions that bear no relation to national development projects. If 
decentralized administrations are given responsibility for managing these areas, 
they quickly run out of means and become dependent on international technical 
assistance.
CONFIRMING THE ROLE OF MPAS AS POLICY INSTRUMENTS
The MPA as a vector of social and policy change and of contradictory 
aspirations
For the decision-maker, the legal expert and the administrator, MPAs normalize 
a socio-economic space according to objectives formulated, in most cases, by the 
State within the framework of international agreements. They appear as a process 
to extend state control on social and economic spaces. However, the different 
societies who have been populating these spaces, sometimes for very long times, 
are based on very different traditional societal organizations with their own 
conception of resource access and exploitation, representations, and principles for 
distribution of wealth and constraints.
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The creation of an MPA regulates space and redefines wealth according to 
scientific principles, with conservation priorities that can be consensual among 
elites but can rapidly be distorted by many factors. Conservation regulations put 
pressure on local populations and, in the end, putting into place protected areas 
induces a certain “violence” whose economic and psycho-sociological impact 
should not be underestimated. 
Without questioning their political legitimacy, analyses of marine or terrestrial 
protected areas reveal the following problems. First, repressive policies may 
accompany the creation of a protected space, to turn it into a space with 
special regulatory administration and normalize its access and the exploitation 
of its resources. Second, the MPA administration becomes a new actor in the 
social life of the area, in various ways that modify significantly the socio-
economic landscape. Third, the creation of a protected area accelerates its 
internationalization and opening to the modern world, which, paradoxically, 
generates new exogenous pressures – from ecotourism, research programmes, 
international trade, promotional visits, and commercial media coverage. Such 
issues call for a new approach to LDC MPAs that need to be necessarily integrated 
into the development process.
Conservation policies have long been based on a naturalistic vision of marine 
areas, implicitly excluding the human populations from related projects. However, 
LDCs populations are not excluded from the global change dynamics. Owing to 
the multiplication of market information and of consumption models, commercial 
opportunities are often more powerful and numerous than ecological discourses 
of moderation. Populations face conflicting aspirations. While worrying about 
their identity, they seek to improve their well-being and are attracted by models of 
economic success. Therefore, MPA space and wealth are part of complex economic 
games. The dominant discourse on conservation and economic moderation tries 
to convince such populations to maintain their meagre subsistence economy, but, 
in contrast, it is accompanied by considerable logistic and financial resources for 
science and conservation.
Diversity and complexity of the institutions involved in MPA governance
Many institutions are involved in MPAs. Their density clouds governance 
transparency in conservation activities and accompanying policies. Legal 
experts involved in the analysis of these institutions are sometimes lost in the 
inextricable “administrative layers”. However, the complexity resulting from the 
multiplication of institutional actors is not the only issue. Conflicts of interest 
as well as the absence of leadership and of clear objectives also contribute to 
the lack of institutional transparency. In fact, the administrative characteristics 
of LDCs are mimicked in MPA administrative processes notwithstanding the 
NGO programmes with “offshore” administrations and ad-hoc institutions. The 
latter take the form of delegated programmes, institutions created at the edge of 
government bureaucracies, and comanagement arrangements in collaboration 
with public or private partners.
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The generic term “protected area” covers very different realities in the LDCs. 
First, it refers to different management systems, as shown by the multiple 
institutional statuses and very different socio-economic and ecological situations 
encountered. Second, the rules applied to these areas and the methods used to 
develop and implement them are determined by very different organizational 
systems and sets of norms. In such conditions, several factors must be taken 
into consideration in order to establish a typology of the institutions in charge 
of MPAs and to clarify the issue of their functional diversity: (i) the degree of 
societal development and of efficacy of the administrative structure, the legal 
nature of territorial circumscriptions defined by the texts establishing the MPAs, 
and the management structure selected to organize these areas, regulate them and 
implement the related constraints; and (ii) the relationship with the State offices, 
often responsible for the creation of these areas and possibly for the direct support 
to regulations implementation as well as for the relationship with local authorities 
in the territories where protected areas are established. Third, the relationship with 
nature conservation non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or foundations that 
support these operations and may substitute for public authorities, using their 
own funds and technical assistance, must be considered.
Difficulties facing the least-developed countries in relation to MPAs
Administration of an MPA creates several difficulties in LDCs. First, it represents 
a serious financial and administrative burden as MPAs are costly in terms of 
administration and monitoring, especially as international recommendations call 
for their “scientific monitoring” and “participatory governance”. Ministerial 
administrations are required to concentrate more particularly on these areas. An 
MPA is, therefore, an area where surveillance is strengthened, requiring more 
resources and administrative support. The effort is all the greater in that the 
administration advocated for these areas rests on modern management methods 
with resources and procedures that are unusual in LDCs. Deconcentration 
without appropriate resources and capacities to control and constrain forces local 
government officials to improvise the local public action. Negotiations in the field, 
between the administration and the actors, become the deconcentrated mode of 
action.
There is also the difficulty of rallying populations when changes likely to affect 
their traditions, lifestyles, and incomes are imposed upon them. Their support is 
all the more difficult to obtain in that constraints are imposed in the name of a 
public interest that is difficult for them to decipher. 
THE SYNERGY BETWEEN CONSERVATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
The need for a more realistic approach 
The legal establishment of a protected area leads to the adoption of a set of public 
decisions and the definition of new strategies established by civil society and the 
administrative apparatus in a dialectic relation over power takeover and sharing of 
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new rights and obligations. This corresponds in some sense to a redistribution of 
societal, political and economic cards in the process of redefining the area.
An MPA project must realistically face the fact that it may cause legitimate 
misunderstandings and resistance. However, it would also be inappropriate to 
deny the modernity of the resident populations of the protected areas, their 
appetite for consumption and change, and the attractiveness of the market and 
Western models. Therefore, in its relationship with MPA actors, public action 
for conservation progresses along a narrow line of, on the one hand, resistance 
to change and, on the other hand, aspirations for globalization types of lifestyles 
standards.
Population support for MPAs
The protected area containing or surrounded by human populations must combine 
conservation and development requirements, but the development dimension of 
MPAs is often absent from conservation projects. If development is not explicitly 
planned, the market (for natural resources, tourism, science and media), in a 
context of local economy deregulation, will usually determine its dimensions in 
the MPA project.
Under these conditions, the scope of regulatory interventions – usually limited 
to policing fishing, gleaning and hunting operations – puts the conservation 
burden on the weakest human strata and seems too limited to ensure conservation. 
Resident populations’ aspiration to “well-being” should be considered a mandatory 
element of the conservation project. If conservation and community well-being 
went hand in hand, the regulatory constraints associated with MPAs might be 
more readily accepted.
An approach should focus on the conditions required to integrate the issue 
of development into the conservation project so that local actors can appropriate 
the implementation of resource conservation. However, this would imply that 
customary rights regulating access be recognized at least in the principles if not 
in their modalities. It is on this basis that dialogue should be opened between 
biodiversity conservation promoters and the local population, given that, when 
they are not destabilized by NGO interventions, the government or the market 
power, community systems of discipline seem to be the most efficient and least 
costly for the community.
Convergence of local and scientific cultures 
The public action project of establishing an MPA is heavily inspired by the 
conservation scientific community and international pressure and does not 
have automatic local legitimacy (Marril, 2006). In these conditions, the project 
promoters must promote convergence between the conservation project and 
the culture of the populations that are being asked to discipline their practices. 
In theory, anthropological approaches and social science studies are supposed 
to make that link and inform managers of the representations, the discipline 
mechanisms and the ethical values of the populations concerned by the change in 
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the status of their domestic and traditional space. However, it is undeniable that, 
while natural science data are overabundant, systematic studies on the human 
or socio-economic dimensions are relatively absent. Yet, the manager’s work 
aims at matching conservation objectives with the populations’ aspirations and 
principles and this requires that the history and the condition of these populations 
be scientifically studied. Nonetheless, poorly informed external interventions 
have been widely observed – by overvaluing certain actors in the communities, 
such interventions may destabilize societal mechanisms and promote damaging 
opportunism.
Local actors as the main beneficiaries of an MPA
Notwithstanding the difficulties, the effects of nature conservation policies must 
benefit the residents, otherwise their positive participation in the conservation 
project cannot be assured. The principles of distribution of wealth and its 
appropriation by the communities should be the minimum counterbalancing 
benefit that populations should expect in exchange for the expectation to control 
(discipline) their natural resource exploitation practices. Protection against market 
excesses must also be included in the reflection process, given that the poorest 
and most vulnerable residents are asked to make efforts while significant wealth is 
created in the wake of MPAs, often without any consideration of the distribution 
and solidarity principles governing these groups and explaining their relative 
productive moderation. For example, banning shark fishing in the Banc d’Arguin 
National Park illustrates the gap between managers and populations – while 
fishing for sharks is permitted everywhere around the national park, the Banc’s 
fishers are controlled and subject to special exploitation conditions that hinder 
their income opportunities. These strategies reveal a lack of coherence between 
policies inside and outside the MPA.
The consequences of the shortcomings of LDCs for MPA governance
A project for the conservation of natural resources and biodiversity in LDCs 
cannot be detached from their weak institutional environment; indeed, such a 
project would highlight contradictions and difficulties. The three most important 
West African coastal and marine protected areas illustrate, in different ways, the 
absence or deficiencies of the government, responsible in the first instance for 
these territorial policies agreed in front of the international community. These 
shortcomings take different forms in MPAs. First, the inability of the State to 
intervene directly in these projects, illustrated by the process of implicit delegation 
of responsibilities to international programme operators, results in derogation-
type procedures and the bypassing of normal institutions. Second, because of the 
low level of resources available to local authorities to achieve the objectives for 
the protected area, the bulk of official administrative action consists of rhetoric 
and the production of formal regulations. Third, the negotiation procedures with 
local actors for the enforcement of laws drafted by the administration are far from 
being transparent or coherent. Fourth, there is little or no coordination between 
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administrative interventions and competition among services to monopolize skills, 
resources and control over resources or populations.
Although these shortcomings could also apply to other LDC administrations 
in more politically sensitive sectors such as health, education and infrastructure, 
the aggravating factor in MPAs is that their implementation requires costly 
and sophisticated administrative methods that contribute only indirectly to 
development. The MPA establishment requires scientific monitoring and data-
based management, and data requiring logistic and financial effort and high-
level technical skills. Must it be concluded that LDCs will have to delegate their 
sovereignty over these protected areas to external operators in order to meet their 
environmental responsibilities? This is what has been highlighted by the present 
work on West Africa. The MPAs can only be somehow operational with the 
financial and logistic contributions of developed countries with, as a result, the 
marginalization of administrations that are not in a position to fulfil their mandate. 
These observations mean that proposals to restructure LDC MPA governance are 
required.
19 
3. Demographic and economic 
constraints on MPA governance 
in LDCs
Jean-Yves Weigel, Bozena Stomal, Jean Schmitz, Pierre Morand, Mohamed Ould 
Saleck and Alfredo Simao Da Silva
Governance of MPAs in LDCs, especially the regulation of access to resources, 
faces demographic constraints related to the increasing density and mobility of the 
resident or neighbouring populations. The densification is caused by one of the 
highest birth rates in the world; for example, in West African LDCs, this rate implies 
a doubling of the population every 25 years. The increase in mobility during the 
last 30 years can be explained in part by the expansion of fishing capacity and more 
specifically by the increase in the number of boats and their motorization.
This governance also faces two main economic constraints related to deregulation. 
The first one is the unchecked increase in natural resources exploitation in fisheries, 
forestry, agriculture and agroforestry. Deregulation has resulted in a drastic 
reduction in management instruments and weakening of public administrations, 
which no longer have the resources needed to control the intensification of resource 
exploitation. This illustrates the waning economic role of governments and the lack 
of public management. The second economic constraint generated by deregulation 
concerns the economic extraversion of the MPAs or their periphery, reflecting their 
submission to market logics and their integration into the globalization process. 
While this constraint concerns all the LDC rural populations, the “indigenous” 
approach to MPAs has often tended to underestimate or ignore its impact on MPA 
inhabitants. 
POPULATION DENSIFICATION
Natural growth in the resident human population is not specific to coastal and 
marine protected areas, but it is, generally, a feature of the demographic context 
of LDCs. On the one hand, the birth rate has remained high while, on the other 
hand, the mortality rate has decreased significantly as a result of, inter alia, 
vaccination campaigns that reach isolated areas (albeit imperfectly). However, the 
protected areas discussed have a noticeably higher mortality rate than the rest of 
the country, except for the Banc d’Arguin National Park, which is in line with 
the national average.11 Mortality is high as these isolated areas lack basic sanitary 
11 The growth rate in the resident population in the coastal and marine protected areas taken into account 
was estimated at 3.5 percent in 2003: 4.5 percent for the Banc d’Arguin National Park, 3.7 percent for 
the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve, and 2.8 percent for the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere 
Reserve. For all the coastal and marine protected areas taken into account, the birth rate was estimated 
at 4.7 percent in 2003: 4.2 percent for the Banc d’Arguin National Park, 4.8 percent for the Saloum 
Delta Biosphere Reserve, and 4.7 percent for the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve 
(CONSDEV, 2003).
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infrastructure and health care; in particular, evacuation of patients towards the 
nearest urban centres is difficult.
The positive migratory balance observed in West African coastal and marine 
protected areas shows how attractive they are in LDCs. This attraction can be 
partly explained by the significant immigration of the peripheral or distant rural 
populations, attracted by natural resource exploitation opportunities in and around 
the MPAs. In 2003, the migratory balance in all the coastal and marine protected 
areas in West Africa was estimated at 0.6 per 100 inhabitants (CONSDEV, 2003). 
However, this immigration rate is not different from that going to urban centres or 
western Europe, in the classical pattern of West African rural exodus. This positive 
migratory balance is particularly significant in the case of the Banc d’Arguin 
National Park, where it was estimated at 1.8 per 100 inhabitants. It is confirmed by 
the residents’ place of birth, with three-quarters of them born outside the park and 
one-quarter of them having come into the Park less than ten years ago, primarily 
to fish. In this protected area, the number of long-term immigrants, four-fifths of 
whom came in to fish, is five times higher than the number of long-term emigrants 
(CONSDEV, 2003; Mohamed Ould Saleck, Limam and Weigel, 2005).
However, population densification within a given coastal and marine protected 
area is not homogeneous. In fact, several non-exclusive densification criteria 
can be noted. The first criterion relates to the ease with which resources can be 
accessed and fishery products can be transported outside protected areas, by road 
or by sea. The second criterion relates to the proximity of equipment facilities or 
specific infrastructure built by development programmes, in particular fisheries 
programmes (ice plants, landing docks, processing areas, etc.). The third criterion 
relates to natural conditions, such as the availability of fish or forest resources or 
arable land. The fourth criterion is the proximity with the MPA, as communities 
in “bordering” locations can benefit from the MPA but escape restrictions applied 
in protected areas.
INCREASED POPULATION MOBILITY
Mobility is principally expressed in terms of seasonal migration, which, in coastal 
and marine protected areas, takes three main forms. The first form may be called 
offshore mobility, is characterized by the fact that the fisher’s home port is located 
outside the protected area in which fishing will be eventually conducted, and the 
functional autonomy of the fishing unit is such that there is practically no need for 
any contact with the land within the MPA, thus avoiding the controls on access 
to the protected area and its resources. The second form, internal mobility, is the 
seasonal migration of residents within a protected area with the view to ascertain 
their territorial claims and indigenous status. The third form is the seasonal or 
longer migration of non-residents, the scale of which confirms the attractiveness 
of protected areas. These three forms are discussed in more detail below.
The first notable form of seasonal migration in LDC coastal and marine 
protected areas, offshore mobility, is a typical example of the “protected area 
effect” insofar as its major goal is to avoid the regulations protecting the area. 
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It is a kind of bypass strategy. This seasonal migration involves operationally 
autonomous fishing boats that do not have to land their catches in the MPA and 
can avoid constraints related to resource access and exploitation. Their bases are 
located along the edge of national parks or biosphere reserves in order to cut access 
costs to much-coveted resources while avoiding onshore constraints, possibly 
with the complicity of members of the relevant administrative services. The most 
obvious West African examples being large-scale fishing by the Niominka and 
Lebou in the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve in Guinea-Bissau 
from Ziguinchor in the south of Senegal (Box 1), or motorized artisanal fishing 
BOX 1
Transborder offshore artisanal fishing, Casamance (south of Senegal) – 
Bijagos Archipelago (Guinea-Bissau)
Alfredo Simao Da Silva
The network of transboundary, large-scale, artisanal fisheries in the Bolama Bijagos 
Archipelago Biosphere Reserve (Guinea-Bissau) is based in Ziguinchor and, to a lesser 
extent, in Elinkine and Kafountine in Casamance (Senegal). It comprises 20 m canoes 
with a maximum load capacity of some 30 tonnes, fitted with one or two 40 horsepower 
engines, using driftnets, set nets or lines. These technical characteristics mean that there is 
practically no need to land in inhabited parts and that catches can be landed at the home 
port of Ziguinchor. In 2004, this offshore network consisted of 200 very large fishing 
canoes, i.e. more than 1 500 fishers operating in the Guinea-Bissau exclusive economic 
zone, in particular in the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve, renowned for 
its abundant fish resources, representing a solution to the overexploitation of Senegalese 
waters. Three main types of fishing may be distinguished (see map). 
The most common type is driftnet fishing, the dominant activity for some 130 canoes 
and 1 100 fishers, for the most part Niominkas from the Saloum Delta islands. They 
target species of high commercial value such as barracudas, threadfins (Polynemidae), 
jacks (Carangidae, etc.) that can be found in different fishing zones depending on the 
season and require trips of 8–10 days.
Fixed net and handline fishing are the dominant activity of about 50 canoes 
and fewer than 300 fishers, for the most part Lebous coming from the Cape Verde 
peninsula or St Louis in Senegal; while fixed net fishing targets principally soles, line 
fishing focuses primarily on sea breams, African red snappers and groupers in fishing 
zones that are practically the same as those of driftnet fishing. Only about 20 Niominka 
fishing units with 150 fishers continue to fish for sharks (there were more than 50 in 
the 1990s according to Dème and Diadhiou [1990]). This fishery is prosecuted all year 
round. It involves three-week trips during which the fins and other catches are kept 
salted. Overexploitation of the various shark and ray species explains the decline in the 
size of the specialized fleet despite the steady increase in fin prices  
Sources: Dahou (2004); Da Silva (2005).
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from towns (Mamghar and Nouadhibou) located near the Banc d’Arguin National 
Park in Mauritania.
The second notable form of seasonal migration in LDC coastal and marine 
protected areas is the internal mobility of the residents (Box 2), who, in this 
way, reaffirm their territorial claim over fishing grounds and fishing itineraries 
or transhumance over the claims of non-residents (seasonal or longer-term 
immigrants); the “resident” status is another expression of this claim for indigenous 
rights. This mobility is related to the history of the settlements in these areas and of 
the emergence of affinities and geopolitical entities. Residents’ claims are grounded 
principally on ancient migratory patterns based either on territorial “proximity” 
of fishing or grazing itineraries, or of agricultural land, or on geopolitical affinities 
dictated by family, clan or tribal ties. Population densification leads to increased 
mobility, which results in the increased occupation of ancient but little-used 
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MAP 3 
Migrations of Senegalese offshore fishing units in the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago 
Biosphere Reserve
Sources: Dahou (2004); Da Silva (2005).
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fishing or agricultural areas and sometimes even to seasonal camps becoming 
permanent settlements. New opportunities related to market demands and trade 
liberalization also contribute to this increase as they promote the development 
of new insular migratory patterns. This pressure increases the stakes for control 
of territories also claimed, in particular, by non-residents, and contributes to an 
increase in the mobility of residents with the view to reaffirm their own control 
over the spaces concerned.
The third notable form of seasonal migration in LDC coastal and marine protected 
areas, the seasonal migration of non-residents (Box 3), shows the attraction exerted 
by MPAs. Like the internal mobility of residents, it can claim to follow ancient 
BOX 2 
Inter island mobility of the residents of the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago 
Biosphere Reserve
Bozena Stomal and Alfredo Simao Da Silva
Residents’ internal mobility relates to the “proximity-based” territorial claim of a 
village over an island or part of an island. Nineteen villages of the archipelago claim 
land rights over islets or parts of islands with the view to develop seasonal farming or 
fishing activities or else negotiate the establishment of tourist facilities. However, the 
interisland mobility is not limited solely to this proximity-based territorial claim as 
it is also organized according to clanic affiliation. Each Bijogo belongs to one of the 
four matrilineal clans (djorçon) of the archipelago (Oraga, Oracuma, Ogubane and 
Ominka). This connection contributes to structure family ties and hence to broaden 
internal mobility on the basis of five geocultural and linguistic Bijogo entities: the 
first one concerns the islands of Bubaque and Canhabaque; the second one consists of 
the islands of Soga and Galinhas; the third comprises ten islands situated in the south 
of the archipelago (Orango, Orangozinho, Canogo, Meneque, Imbone, Unhocomo, 
Unhocomozinho, Uno, Uracane and Eguba); the fourth is the island of Formosa; 
and the fifth covers the islands of Caravela, Canache, Nago and Chedia (Cardoso, 
2002). Such strong traditional internal migrations can be explained by the dynamism 
of ancestral production systems as traditional activities such as paddy-field or slash-
and-burn rice cultivation (47 percent), palm wine tapping (9 percent), straw gathering 
(8 percent), palm plantation work (4 percent) and agriculture (4 percent) still employ 
three-quarters of resident seasonal migrants. However, new economic opportunities, 
such as the picking of cashew nuts (13 percent) from plantations of the cashew tree 
(Anacardium occidentale) and to a lesser extent, fishing (9 percent) and tourism 
(3 percent), already employ one-quarter of the resident seasonal migrants and a much 
higher proportion of non-resident seasonal migrants (CONSDEV, 2003). These 
activities are beginning to change traditional patterns, with a growing importance of 
cashew nut plantations especially in the islands of Carache and Caravela and that of 
fishing in Uno and Uracane. The main interisland migratory patterns of residents are 
shown on the accompanying map.
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migratory cycles and itineraries. Overall, the flow of non-resident seasonal migrants 
towards protected areas is higher than the flow of resident seasonal migrants out 
of them. Non-resident seasonal migrants prefer activities related to new fishing 
opportunities or market openings leading to their exploitation of any possible new 
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niche. This opportunistic strategy calls for diversification, e.g. of the range of fishing 
gear and sites in order to adapt fishing to the seasonal distribution of the resource.
INCREASED EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
The unchecked increase in exploitation concerns fishery, forestry (lumber, 
fuelwood and charcoal) and even agricultural or agroforestry resources (cashew 
trees and oil-palms). In the case of fishery resources, the increased exploitation is 
the result of the development of artisanal fisheries, amplified by the many projects 
funded within the framework of bilateral or multilateral aid to LDCs. At the 
BOX 3
Seasonal migration of non-resident Subalbe fishers in the Saloum Delta 
Biosphere Reserve
Jean Schmitz
The seasonal migration of Subalbe shrimp fishers in the Saloum Delta is a good 
example of seasonal migration of non-residents insofar as it shows that coastal and 
marine protected areas are features of the migratory pathways of migrant communities 
that are increasingly settled in multiple locations. The “multilocalization” of Subalbe 
fishers’ activities covers three distinct areas: (i) an agricultural homebase in the Senegal 
River valley; (ii) home ports all along the Gambia Estuary (Essau, Banjul and Albreda); 
and (iii) the shrimp fishing grounds in the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve. The 
comparative advantage of the reserve for Subalbe shrimp fishing enterprises only lasts 
for three months, from the end of August to the beginning of December. The monitoring 
of Subalbe fishing enterprises based in the Gambia has highlighted their significant 
mobility in three periods (Herry, 2003): (i) roughly, from mid-March to mid-August, 
fishing enterprises, all based in the lower part or the Gambia Estuary in Essau, Albreda 
or Banjul go up to 150 km upstream as far as Kaur; (ii) from the end of August till the 
beginning of December, half of the fishing enterprises travel to the intermediate part 
of the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve between Ndangane and Foundiougne and the 
other half travel towards the lower part of the estuary; (iii) finally, from mid-December 
to the beginning of March, almost all the fishing enterprises return to their home ports 
in the lower part of the Gambia River Estuary (see map).
Subalbe migrants are organized into fishing companies that, on average, consist 
of six men including the company leader and operate a motorized canoe capable of 
towing several smaller ones. The company leaders, as owners of the motorized canoe 
and sometimes also of the individual canoes of young fishers, decide and allocate the 
fishing effort and negotiate resource access with local or administrative authorities, 
including inside the protected area. Thanks to their common understanding, company 
leaders control the various anchorage points along the estuaries and organize the 
migratory cycles and fishing pathways, including in the Saloum Delta Biosphere 
Reserve, according to a community-based organization of migration characterized by 
the multiple locations of the lineage segments to which they and the fishers belong.
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Seasonal Migrations of Subalbe Fishermen in the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve
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Seasonal migrations of Subalbe fishers in the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve
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periphery of coastal and marine protected areas, and sometimes within them, these 
projects have often promoted a so-called “artisanal” fishery actually following a 
semi-industrial logic, as shown by the West African example, with: (i) fishing units 
more than 20 m long, powered accordingly; (ii) enough onboard storage capacity 
to allow trips of several days; (iii) nets that may be more than one kilometre long; 
(iv) catches processed and marketed beyond the local level; and (v) crews that are 
dependents of boat owners or fishmongers (Weigel, Féral and Cazalet, 2007).
This development of artisanal fisheries at the periphery and within LDC 
coastal and marine protected areas has led to a considerable increase in fishing 
effort, in ways that differ between areas. In the West African case, this includes: 
higher number of fishing trips, diversification of techniques (Box 4), and increase 
in both artisanal fishing and processing capacity (Box 5).
BOX 4
Increasing fishing trips and diversifying techniques in the Banc d’Arguin 
National Park
Jean-Yves Weigel and Adelkader Mohamed Ould Saleck
Fishing in the park is characterized by: (i) a limit on the number of fishing craft 
(“lanches”) powered by lateen sails to about 90 units; (ii) a limit on the number of 
motorized canoes based in Mamghar; (iii) the banning of some types of fishing gear or 
techniques; and (iv) the restriction on the number and length of nets carried on board. 
As regards fishing effort, the near total ban on motorized fishing vessels and the use of 
sail power can be seen as an emblematic success for the protection of the fish resources 
of the Banc d’Arguin National Park.
However, this apparent success must not hide the fact that, since the creation of 
the park, there has been an increase in fishing effort. The absence of any restriction 
on the number of fishing trips and the diversification of types of fishing gear led to 
an increase in catch of about 90 percent between 1998 and 2006, now exceeding 2 000 
tonnes (CNROP, 2000; IMROP, 2004; Boncoeur, Roncin and Kane, 2009). In addition, 
the non-governmental organizations and bilateral cooperation organizations, heavily 
involved in funding and managing the park, are responsible for having distributed 
unselective gillnets for capturing meagres – responsible for the bycatch of sharks and 
rays – as well as sea bream and sole nets, fishing lines and preservation equipment (ice 
boxes) within the framework of a reorientation of fishing effort away from sharks and 
rays and towards the meagres and other demersal species.
The result of this diversification is that fishing activity is now sustained all year round 
Seasonal mullet fishing from July to January is followed by fishing for meagres (with 
bycatches of sharks and rays) and giant guitarfish. Then sole, gilt head, red sea bream 
and grouper fishing fill the gaps in lean periods. Finally, diversification has resulted in a 
geographical redistribution of the fishing effort to the benefit of some villages (Arkeiss, 
Agadir and Teichott) and to the detriment of others (R’Gueiba, Mamghar and Iwik) 
Source: Weigel, Féral and Cazalet, 2007.
Governance of marine protected areas in least-developed countries – Case studies from West Africa28
ECONOMIC EXTRAVERSION OF MARINE PROTECTED AREAS
The opening of coastal and marine protected area economies is reflected by the 
value of its “exports”: fish (fresh or artisanally processed), cashew nuts, palm oil, 
and lumber. In the West African case, a conservative estimate of these exports 
amounted to EUR13 million (about US$16 million) (Mohamed Ould Saleck, 
Limam and Weigel, 2005; Weigel, 2005; Duarte et al., 2005). Such exports from 
BOX 5
Increase in artisanal fishing and processing capacity: the case of the Saloum 
Delta Biosphere Reserve
Jean-Yves Weigel
The increase in fishing effort in the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve reflects not 
only an increase in fishing capacity (with the increase in the number of motorized 
fishing vessels and gear) but also increased artisanal processing and trading capacity. 
A comparison of the last two censuses carried out in 1999 and 2003, respectively, in 
the main fishing grounds of the reserve and its close surroundings shows that, in four 
years, there was an increase of 12 percent in the number of motorized boats and of 17 
percent in fishing gear and 15 percent in the number of fishers during the dry season 
(Dème, Diadhiou and Thiam, 2000; CONSDEV, 2003). Thus, in the 2003 dry season, 
the number of fishing units was estimated at 3 500, the number of fishers at about 
6 000 and that of women gathering oysters and shellfish at 2 000. The fishing units 
operate from almost 100 villages and fishing camps. The increase in fishing capacity 
relates to the diversification and the versatility of fishing units as there are no fewer 
than 20 “metiers” (a French term broadly equivalent to “fishing strategies” and relating 
to practices involving the deployment of a specific gear, in a specific area, during a 
particular season, to target a given species or set of species and sizes) in the Saloum 
Delta Biosphere Reserve depending on bio-ecological and seasonal factors (Bousso, 
1996; Dème, 2004). One intensification factor has been development aid that has 
contributed significantly to the increase in fishing capacity by funding development 
projects in the delta or its immediate surroundings, or by funding for mutual savings 
and loans institutions (e.g. as provided by some international non-governmental 
organizations).
In the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve, increased artisanal processing and trading 
capacity contributes to the increase in fishing effort insofar as it leads to increased 
opportunities for value-added fisheries products. Indeed, the artisanal fish-processing 
system continues to employ the great majority of female workers (estimated at more 
than 2 000). In this sector too, development aid has contributed to increased trading 
capacity through the funding of ice-making plants in Missirah and Djifère and of a 
shrimp processing factory in Foundiougne in 2003 (Dème, 2004); it has also helped to 
develop artisanal processing, for example in Diamnadio, on the periphery of the reserve 
(downstream from Foundiougne) by funding smoking and drying facilities (see map). 
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Sources: CONSDEV (2003); Dème (2004); Weigel (2005).
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coastal and marine protected areas are in constant demand, varying according to 
the type of product or market, so that these “exports” are best categorized by 
destination: peripheral or national markets, regional markets, European or Asian 
markets.
The trade flows from West African protected areas towards peripheral, 
national or regional markets encompass a wide range of products: (i) fisheries 
(fish, shellfish, cephalopods, oysters and other molluscs); (ii) forestry (fuelwood 
and lumber, roots, bark and leaves for pharmaceutical use; (iii) apiculture; (iv) 
agroforestry (palm oil and wine); (v) arboriculture (fruit, cashew nuts and wine); 
agriculture (groundnuts, millet and sorghum); (vi) horticulture (vegetables and 
Cucurbitaceae); (vii) cattle raising (bovine, ovine and caprine animals, and camels); 
and (viii) salt. As regards fisheries products, these markets focus on fish of low 
commercial value to fulfil the demand for cheap proteins in order to contribute 
to the food security of urban (and, to a lesser extent, rural) populations. Artisanal 
processing contributes to meeting this demand insofar as it increases the shelf-
life of these products and hence enhances the value of landings (Box 6) in the 
most isolated fishing camps. In the West African case, “exports” from coastal and 
marine protected areas to peripheral national and regional markets were estimated 
at EUR8.5 million (about US$9.4 million) for 2003 (Mohamed Ould Saleck, 
Limam and Weigel, 2005). 
“Exports” from West African coastal and marine protected areas to European 
and Asian markets show that these areas are an integral, albeit modest, part of the 
global economy. Far from the cliché of indigenous populations living in closed-
economy autarchy, they probably reached EUR5 million (about US$5.6 million) 
in 2003 (Mohamed Ould Saleck, Limam and Weigel, 2005; Weigel, 2005; Duarte 
et al., 2005). These “exports” were galvanized by trade liberalization with the 
lifting of formal restrictions on trade transactions in application of a European 
Union facilitation mechanism for exports and imports together with preferential 
tariffs. Such “exports” have promoted trade development and the diversification 
of trade flows. Exports from West African coastal and marine protected areas to 
the European Union have increased significantly in the last ten years, in parallel 
with the increased value of fish landings from the West African exclusive economic 
zone and in response to the strong European demand for fishery products. The 
exports essentially concern species of high commercial value such as demersal 
fish (soles, gilthead sea breams, threadfins [polynemidae], barracudas, red 
snappers, meagres, etc.), cephalopods, crustaceans (shrimps, lobsters), frozen and 
generally unprocessed. Exports from West African coastal and marine protected 
areas to Asian markets principally concern cashew nuts produced in the Bijagos 
Archipelago, shark fins and ray wings for the Chinese market, and frozen 
cephalopods for the Japanese market.
The share of fish landings that is exported illustrates the economic extraversion: 
more than 70 percent of the 30 000 tonnes fished in West African coastal and 
marine protected areas are sold outside these areas, the rest being consumed 
by resident populations. Finally, the last aspect of their extraversion relates to 
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rice imports that place MPAs residents in a relation of food dependency, even 
though they contribute significantly to securing the cereal supply. In 2003, the 
rice imports to these protected areas compensated for the cereal deficit of about 
10 000 tonnes affecting the resident population, which has grown substantially 
and faces worsening cultivation conditions (Mohamed Ould Saleck, Limam and 
Weigel, 2005; Weigel, 2005; Duarte et al., 2005).
Paradoxically, in LDCs, economic extraversion of MPAs can be accompanied 
by a strengthening of community organization and traditional social hierarchies. 
 BOX 6
Trends in value enhancement of fisheries products from the Banc d’Arguin 
National Park
Abdelkader Ould Mohamed-Saleck and Jean-Yves Weigel
The evolution in the value enhancement of fisheries products from the Banc d’Arguin 
National Park in the last 30 years illustrates how trade has developed and commercial 
flows have diversified in marine protected areas. From the park’s creation in 1976 to 
the end of the 1980s, almost the entire catch was processed into tishtar (dried mullet), 
lekhlia (ground tishtar), fish oils (essentially mullet and meagre) for the national 
market, or into poutargue (salted and pressed mullet roe) for the Mediterranean 
market. Communication problems explain why only a small amount of fish was 
commercialized fresh, most of the time from Agadir to Nouadhibou or from Mamghar 
to Nouakchott (Chérif, 2002).
The 1990s saw the massive development of shark and ray fishing as fins and wings 
were exported to Asia via the Gambia. Recent years have been marked by greater 
access to the park, and a significant increase in catches and their estimated deflated 
value from EUR440 000 (about US$520 000) in 1998 to almost EUR1 million (about 
US$1.3 million) in 2006 (CNROP, 2000; CONSDEV, 2003; Mohamed Ould Saleck, 
Limam and Weigel, 2005; Boncoeur, Roncin and Kane, 2009).
The increased value addition of landings is due to the improvement of the connection 
with national, regional, European and Asian markets. The national market connection 
has benefited from the increase in four-wheel-drive vehicles with which traders can 
transport fresh fish towards the cities of Nouakchott and Nouadhibou, which have 
grown exponentially in the last 30 years. The connection to the regional market has 
been improved by the development and the diversification of artisanal processing with 
the export of shark and ray carcasses dried and in brine, and of fermented and dried 
catfish. The connection to the European market is guaranteed by the export of species 
of high commercial value, the most important of which are sea breams and meagres. 
Finally, the connection to the Asian market persists with the export of shark fins and 
ray, which contributes to the profitability of the fishing units concerned. 
The shore colonization, illustrated by the creation of Tessot and Arkeiss villages 
and the increased trader mobility with the multiplication of four-wheel-drive vehicles, 
has led to a relocation of fishing effort and landings. In the last two decades, there has 
been a geographical redistribution of landed values and fishing incomes (see map).
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This tends to increase the community bounding and to slow down the acquisition 
of autonomy by individuals and households. This is confirmed by the analysis of 
access regulation to sites and resources or of productive relationships (Cheikh, 
2003; Dahou and Weigel, 2003; Da Silva, 2003; Stomal and Biai, 2004). The first 
reason behind this strengthening is the explicit legal recognition, by the State, of 
the role of resident communities and of traditional authorities in the management 
and the exploitation of resources in protected areas, sometimes going as far as a 
formal devolution of rights. The second reason is the capture by the traditional 
social hierarchies of the role of guarantor of a rational exploitation of the resources, 
devolved to them by external international actors. In fact, these hierarchies show 
a remarkable capacity to adapt to the opportunities offered by deregulation and 
trade liberalization as, encouraged by the ways in which donor agencies intervene, 
they are perceived as the guarantors of self-sufficient fisheries or agricultural 
production systems. 
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4. The legal context of 
governance of marine protected 
areas in the least-developed 
countries: a syncretic legal system
François Féral and Bertrand Cazalet
The analysis of the legal context reveals the international inspiration behind the 
conceptual framework, the objectives and the conservation procedures of LDC 
MPAs. This analysis also leads to the legal definition of an MPA, in most cases, as 
the circumscription of an administered and regulated area. The study of the legal 
context shows that state and societal law coexist in these areas. This coexistence 
not only reflects the law applied in the protected areas but also, more broadly, the 
law applied in most LDCs where the State and its administration negotiate with the 
civil society as to how the law should be applied in order to achieve its objectives. 
Research undertaken in West Africa shows that an MPA is the manifestation of 
a strong legal state control of social space encountering a revival of traditional 
societal rights. This dual nature generates a new type of original negotiated right, 
neither state-based nor societal, reflecting a legal syncretism.
THE INTERNATIONAL INSPIRATION BEHIND THE OBJECTIVES AND 
PROCEDURES
The international origin of conservation policies
National conservation policies are widely inspired by international processes 
that make heavy demands on LDCs. These processes illustrate the expansion 
towards countries of the South of nature conservation theses developed in Western 
countries, triggered by the awareness-raising in LDCs of the rapid deterioration of 
their natural wealth. Hence, in all these countries, the centralized State apparatus 
relays the demands formulated in international conferences and conveyed by 
European or North American NGOs. It is in the wake of large conferences 
dealing with protected areas that the LDCs party to these large events have 
committed themselves to MPAs.
International inspiration is present not only in the adoption of the broad nature 
conservation and sustainable development principles but also in the identification 
of areas that must be protected given their ecological interest. The legal and 
institutional analysis of West African coastal and marine protected areas has 
made it possible to retrace the trends in this international inspiration – a nature 
conservation concept based on the integration of populations into the management 
project has replaced a unilateral and centralized one. A double importation, 
legal and institutional, has been observed: the new importation of international 
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conservation principles and objectives, and the older importation of administrative 
intervention methods inherited from colonizing countries.
The integration of international operational principles for MPAs in LDCs 
is not without its share of difficulties as this supposes the establishment of 
regulatory administrations having sophisticated means for scientific research and 
management, while the state apparatuses of these countries have been seriously 
weakened by structural adjustment plans.
Dependence on international assistance
The analysis of the legal functioning of West African coastal and marine protected 
areas shows that, on the whole, their management is based on a system of 
coadministration between the State and international institutional donors or 
NGOs involved in environmental conservation. This coadministration may be 
explained, in part, by the need for expert assistance in setting up institutions, 
nature conservation standards and management measures, which induces a 
dependence on international institutions or NGOs, or developed countries, via 
their cooperation mechanisms.
Thus, the study of these protected areas highlights an original aspect of their 
governance: States do not cooperate so much with their own civil society as 
they do with an “imported civil society” comprising international networks of 
conservation researchers and NGOs. The weight of the international policies is 
reflected in the multiplication of general or specific conservation programmes. 
Lacking the necessary means, the various national administrations, most often, 
depend on Western programmes and each of them can operate as intermediaries 
(relays) in operations funded by international NGOs, international cooperation 
agencies, and cooperation services of developed countries (Galletti, 2002). 
Therefore, the issue is that a sustainable conservation policy based on own 
initiatives of responsible LDCs would requires a minimum of autonomy in 
resources and decision-making.
THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF A MARINE PROTECTED AREA AND THE LEGAL 
ACTS
Legal definition of a marine protected area
From a legal and administrative viewpoint, an MPA is the circumscription of a 
regulated and administered area where legal competence is allocated to the various 
administrative authorities involved in the processes of creation, management 
and coercion. Protected areas are generally administered by deconcentrated and 
specialized structures under the authority of central administrations. Regulatory 
powers are usually established by a law that is the foundation for conservation 
and management measures and signals the takeover of a particular space by the 
state administration in order to implement policies most often conceptualized 
at the international or national level. Then, depending on its traditions and its 
constraints, each State puts in place the measures and resources needed for a 
successful implementation of these policies.
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The first founding legal act in setting up a protected area is a framework law 
that establishes, on the national territory, the concept of the circumscription of an 
administered space where special regulatory measures will apply, modifying the more 
general rights of persons and, incidentally, of businesses. The creation of numerous 
institutions holding regulatory powers disrupts the normal administrative process 
in these spaces. On the one hand, this introduces specialized deconcentrated area 
management authorities that compete with the “normal” communities or state-
delegated administrations. On the other hand, it leads to transfers of responsibility 
and power towards the government, possibly in contradiction with rules concerning 
decentralization or territorial deconcentration.
The second fundamental legal act is to define specific protection areas. The 
principle consists in defining parts of the national territory where a particular 
legal system will be applied to private activities and administrative institutions. 
According to the new international conception, the creation and definition 
mechanisms must organize the interaction with the populations and actors 
involved in the operation. Studies undertaken in West African coastal and marine 
protected areas tend to show that the lower degree of organization of populations 
and actors does not allow the same type of negotiation undertaken in developed 
countries, i.e. a public inquiry carried out by independent authorities with 
reasonable resources and deadlines so as to provide a firm basis for the decision 
of state authorities.
Zoning – the process of defining subareas within the MPA – depends 
essentially on geographical and ecological complexity as well as on the size of the 
population, and it illustrates the growing complexity of MPA administration and 
regulation. However, generally, in LDCs, this complexity owes more to the results 
of scientific work than to a lengthy interaction process with local populations and 
actors, and it does not facilitate the understanding and management of these spaces. 
An example of this complexity is the zoning of the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago 
Biosphere Reserve, which includes Joao Vieira and Poilao National Park, Orango 
National Park and the Urok community-based MPA. The large number of special 
spaces with different regimes and particular rules confuses conservation policies 
even further: parks with ecological sanctuaries and sacred forests, conservation 
zones, buffer zones, sustainable development zones, and controlled exploitation 
zones. These various perimeters within the biosphere reserve should be coherently 
organized around a core zone where conservation and integral protection are 
priority objectives. Then, there are sustainable development buffer zones, with 
restrictions on the amount and type of activity authorized, and transition zones, 
where potential for development is accepted within an integrated management 
framework. Finally, restoration zones are established to rebuild the landscape, 
cultural or environmental potential of degraded parts of the protected area.
Administrative and jurisdictional acts
Legal competencies result in administrative measures that regulate private activities 
and ownership and in judicial sentences or administrative penalties to enforce 
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the rules imposed in an MPA. The example of West African coastal and marine 
protected areas shows that, in LDCs, regulatory measures are implicitly based 
on the principle of prohibition and also on that of tolerance of some traditional 
activities provided that certain practices are abandoned.
Hence, in the Banc d’Arguin National Park in Mauritania, the aim of measures 
is to control the number of residents and the ways in which resources are exploited 
by establishing a total ban on all activities, with a dispensation for indigenous 
people. Therefore, persons and groups are tolerated that “usually do... usually 
practice ... have traditional cultivation rights… to satisfy domestic needs… and 
subsistence fishing” (cf. Article 11 of Law no. 2000-24 of 19 January 2000), even 
though their activity is thoroughly regulated (Fall Ould Mouhamedou, 2003). 
Thus, the regulation of fishing operations in the park is almost obsessional, 
while it has been shown that fishing by the Imraguens is connected to national, 
regional and international markets, and that the flows of goods generated by this 
connection, as well as tourism activities, are poorly regulated or unregulated.
In the Bijagos Archipelago, traditional lifestyles appear to be well preserved. 
This is confirmed when reading the decree establishing the Orango National Park, 
as it defends the traditional activities and lifestyles of resident populations insofar 
as they do not harm the ecological heritage or resident communities’ well-being so 
as not to affect the natural and cultural values of the protected area (cf. Articles 4, 
5 and 6 of Decree 11/00 of 4 December 2000 establishing the Orango National 
Park). The activities in the archipelago are divided into prohibited and conditional. 
Prohibited activities are those potentially harmful for the environment and the 
natural equilibrium of ecosystems, e.g. human settlements and other constructions, 
infrastructure or any activity likely to alter the physiognomy and the topography 
of the area. Conditional activities are subject to authorizations from park officials 
in sustainable development zones (Articles 2, 9 and 32 of Decree 11/00 of 
4 December 2000 establishing the Orango National Park) (Quade, 2003).
In LDCs, the implementation of MPA management norms is difficult in a 
context of low-level financial resources and the limits of a governance model 
that is often centralized. In theory, all violations of prohibitions and police 
recommendations are subject to penalties within a legal regime – police reports, 
prosecutions, court referrals, sanction fines and prison sentences are specified 
in the various legal texts. Nonetheless, the example of West African coastal and 
marine protected areas shows that the enforcement of these norms is dealt with 
practically exclusively at the level of the administrations of the protected areas (as 
indicated by the small number of court judgements) rather that at the national 
level.
The marine protected area as an institutional system
The creation of control, management and decision-making structures constitutes 
an institutional process. Here again, governments inspired by models from 
developed countries have created bodies in charge of the different coastal and 
marine protected areas. These bodies are primarily state structures, e.g. public 
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institutions or decentralized administrations, and their legitimacy in the eyes 
of populations as well as the type of relationship that they must maintain with 
decentralized institutions are central issues.
The institution designated to implement MPAs may be a public body. 
Created by the State to fulfil a specialized mandate of the State, the public body 
has a legal status and management autonomy. Its state character is highlighted 
by the fact that: (i) its director is nominated by the State; (ii) its funds are 
under public management; (iii) the staff consist of civil servants; and (iv) it has 
exclusive legal competence. The public body is considered to be an “operational 
deconcentration of the State” but the choice of this legal terminology reflects 
the centralized nature of the conservation project, e.g. in the Banc d’Arguin 
National Park in Mauritania. Operational and territorial deconcentration can 
also be entrusted to a simple territorially deconcentrated service, such as in 
Senegal where the National Parks Directorate (Direction des parcs nationaux) 
is in charge of the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve, the Saloum Delta National 
Park and the Bamboung Community-based MPA. However, the weakness in 
this formula may be the lack of an operational and hierarchical link between 
the National Parks Directorate and all the other deconcentrated state services 
operating in these areas. The result is inextricable “administrative layering”, 
which does not appear to be effective.
Paradoxically, decentralization occurs in a context of increasing state control 
over the protected areas. Fortunately, in practice, the state system is softened 
either by participatory procedures or by the granting of a degree of independence 
of local administrations from the central authority. Generally, administrative and 
consultative bodies have recently increased in number. All the committees and 
councils that gravitate around conservation issues foresee the participation of 
the actors involved in the protected areas. It is not only an approach based on 
negotiation and participation, but also a legitimization process. The State can no 
longer impose its solutions from above, based on its technocratic information. 
However, decentralization may induce relational problems between management 
institutions, decentralized authorities and deconcentrated institutions, and it can 
lead to genuine issues of legitimacy. Lacking the resources to combat poaching and 
illegal logging, the State switches from repression to a subtle game of awareness-
raising and negotiation with local leaders and dignitaries through the creation of 
committees or the adoption of codes of conduct.
As regards the legitimization of national control of MPAs, the strong influence 
of conservation NGOs in LDCs cannot be ignored. Countless administrative 
tasks are undertaken by these organizations. The funding of surveillance services, 
scientific evaluations, development of management plans, and technical assistance 
at all levels demonstrate their presence and availability in the field, legitimizing 
their statements on sustainable development. The joint commitment of bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation agencies strengthens the legitimacy of national 
control through the injection of material or financial resources and strengthening 
of collective organization within the protected areas.
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A SYNCRETIC LEGAL SYSTEM
State legal control versus a diversity of customary laws
Whatever the legitimacy of the operation, the establishment of an MPA is, in 
most cases, a process of increased state legal control over a given space. At an 
institutional level, the implementation of MPAs implies an intensified state and 
administrative activity and the resident populations are usually confronted with a 
stronger normative and prescriptive state presence. The use of the natural wealth 
is the main focus of the legal regime, which is also concerned with the regulation 
of for example: economic activities and opportunities; the habitat; the use of 
equipment or the implementation of practices; waste management.
However, these norms cannot be applied mechanically and the administration 
cannot always achieve its objectives given the predominance of local practices 
and societal mechanisms, which can be upset when the administrations in 
charge applies the state norms. Lacking resources, often abandoned by their 
line authority, the staff on the ground have no option but to construct a mixed 
administrative model combining the application of state norms and a support of 
local practices. Therefore, the application of norms is negotiated in a context of 
multiple legal systems. The administrations undertake to control the area and its 
activities, to an extent depending on means available and local circumstances. This 
negotiated right looks rich, ingenious, pragmatic and, in the end, quite efficient 
given the resources available.
The coexistence of several judicial systems, in negotiation and dialectic 
opposition, leads to a legal system that can be described as syncretic. First, 
the state and formal legal system produces a corpus of special policies within 
a circumscription. It interferes directly or indirectly with traditional patterns 
of wealth distribution, e.g. with rights of access to fisheries resources that are 
traditionally allocated within the framework of local authorizations and rules, 
or with land ownership rights governing the exploitation of pastoral, forestry or 
agricultural resources. Second, traditional rules that dictate access and use rights 
often remain decisive. The syncretic dimension of legal systems confirms the 
vitality of the various actors.
Three illustrations of legal syncretism
Legal syncretism manifests itself differently depending on the protected area 
considered, both in the way rules are applied and in how their content is 
elaborated. Although there are relatively marginal differences between the various 
legal systems adopted by States, the administrative practices create the distinction 
between three forms of administration: (i) an administration seeking consensus 
with local authorities (Box 7); (ii) an administration negotiating the application of 
state norms (Box 8); and (iii) a validation of village powers by the State (Box 9).
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BOX 7
An administration seeking consensus with local authorities: the case of the 
Banc d’Arguin National Park
François Féral and Bertrand Cazalet
Concertation between the administration and local populations is emblematic of the 
Banc d’Arguin National Park. Concertation workshops are organized annually and 
have enabled the relatively consensual adoption of measures to restrict fishing activities 
since 1998. This process of concertation and facilitation is well organized, as shown 
by the strong support for proposed measures, the strong administrative presence in 
situ, the organization of compensation and accompanying measures at manageable 
levels, and the surveillance of the population despite its dispersion over a vast area. 
However, the issues at stake in value enhancement of fish resources have “woken up” 
tributary systems that govern resource access and wealth distribution. A change in the 
composition of tribal hierarchies and allegiance systems has been noted, with leading 
figures seeking to control tribal territories, framed by a permanent administrative 
presence (Cheikh and Mohamed Ould Saleck, 2002). At the same time, the concertation 
process has contributed to the emergence of what might be called an infratribal legal 
level, evident in the organization of fishing activities within and between villages that 
establish by themselves a strict zoning, in particular during the mullet fishing season. 
This organization is influenced by an ancient traditional discipline (Worms and 
Mouloud Ould Eida, 2002). Thus, the concertation process contributes both to the 
resurgence of tribal organization and to the strengthening of the traditional discipline 
system, counterbalancing the weight of the park administration and of international 
non-governmental organizations. It results in a fragile consensus on the control of 
fishing effort.
BOX 8
Negotiating the application of state norms: the case of the Saloum Delta 
Biosphere Reserve
François Féral and Bertrand Cazalet
In the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve, which includes the Saloum Delta National 
Park and the Bamboung Community-based MPA, villagers are flexible and negotiate 
regulatory rules with local officials in a context characterized by multiple legal 
references and by an “administrative layering” that leads to open competition between 
the different state administrations. In reality, the societal organization of the local area 
and the resulting socioethnic equilibria are relatively impervious to administrative 
conservation rules. This situation is illustrated by the “Beach Committee”, which 
can be equated to a mechanism of professional discipline insofar as its main function 
Continues
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BOX 9
Validation of village powers by the State: the case of the Bolama Bijagos 
Archipelago Biosphere Reserve
François Féral and Bertrand Cazalet
The rules relating to the sacred zones that are included in the state conservation 
texts and in the administration of the parks are an example of the confirmation of 
village powers in this reserve, which comprises Joao Vieira and Poilao National Park, 
Orango National Park and the Urok Community-based Marine Protected Area. 
The State has integrated societal norms into traditional foundations, facilitating the 
assimilation of environmental regulatory norms. Another example is provided by the 
validation of access authorizations delivered by traditional chiefs, who, in the absence 
of a state administration, negotiate resource access with foreigners in a contractual 
framework in which, however, the reference to resource conservation is not always 
explicit. These village authorizations are validated by the provisions of Article 32 of 
the decree concerning the organization of the Orango National Park; the concession 
of the right being considered valid if the administration has not responded within 90 
days. The integration of societal norms implicitly acknowledges traditional Bijogo 
hierarchies such as the clan (djorçon), the “king”, the council of elders and the age 
classes. The council of elders, bringing together the “great men” (the initiators), 
grants use and settlement rights; the 30s and 40s age groups organize work within the 
production units. Hence, in this biosphere reserve, the marginal presence of the State 
of Guinea-Bissau leads to informal governance where village hierarchies hold genuine 
jurisdictional power ratified by the state administration 
Source: Quade, 2003).
is to control fishing effort, but which in fact represents the Village Council. The 
perpetual negotiation of the administration with village chiefs can be explained by the 
few resources available to the officials of this reserve and of the park to implement 
compensation measures, especially as administrative control and the surveillance of 
a large and heterogeneous population are difficult to organize given the very high 
demographic pressure and the inextricable ethnic or community interweaving. This 
negotiation leads to management complexity, which explains why state control can 
only be maintained through implicit power delegations. Thus, “Beach Committees” 
illustrate this delegated power and simply reflect the recognition of the “administrative” 
power granted to the village chief to regulate access to fish resources 
Source: Guèye, 2003.
Box 8 continued
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5. Governance systems of 
marine protected areas in least-
developed countries: analytical 
framework, characterization and 
weaknesses
Jean-Yves Weigel, Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, Jean Schmitz and Alfredo 
Simao Da Silva
In order to identify MPA governance issues in LDCs and propose suitable public 
policy options, a comprehensive examination of governance in each MPA or 
MPA network is required. A review of the literature has shown the dominance 
of normative and prescriptive texts advocating good governance and the relative 
scarcity of thorough scientific analyses, and this to the detriment of thorough 
analyses (Weigel, 2008). This leads to the conclusion that an analytical framework 
for MPA governance is lacking and that such a framework should take into 
account governance specificities in LDCs.
Therefore, an analytical framework has been developed, drawing inspiration 
from four sources. The first source is the interactive fisheries governance approach, 
largely developed by the Centre for Maritime Research (Kooiman et al., 2005), 
which stresses public and private interactions to solve societal problems and create 
societal opportunities. The second is the risk governance approach developed 
by TRUSTNET,12 a European pluralistic think-tank, which identifies two 
paradigms of risk governance: top-down, and mutual trust. The third source is the 
socioanthropology of mediations and brokerage, mainly developed by the École 
des hautes études en sciences sociales (Olivier de Sardan, 1998), which highlights 
the plurality and the intricacy of socio-economic organizations and institutions, 
the sociocultural features, and the emergence of new mediators and “development 
brokers” in LDCs. The fourth is the governance analytical framework, developed 
at the initiative of  the Institut universitaire d’études du développement (Hufty 
et al., 2007), which suggests a system based on five main components.
The analytical framework adopted, which should provide the basis for a 
comparative approach applicable to all governance systems, indicates five main 
components that should be explored to give operational content to the governance 
concept: (i) define governance problems; (ii) describe the norms with which 
governance should comply; (iii) classify the governance actors; (iv) identify the 
nodal points where actors’ strategies clash; and (v) reconstruct the process that led 
to the current governance system.
12 www.trustnetinaction.com
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This analytical framework makes it possible to characterize the different MPA 
governance systems in LDCs. It has been applied to the two most important 
West African coastal and marine protected areas: the Banc d’Arguin National 
Park in Mauritania, and the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve in 
Guinea-Bissau. Two governance systems have been identified: a hierarchical and 
instrumentalized13 system and a community-based concession system.
The characterization of governance systems highlights their weaknesses, 
making it possible to suggest how to restructure them and propose new 
public policy options. The main weaknesses concern: the limits of fisheries 
management; the absence of financial sustainability; the disproportionate role of 
international NGOs and institutions; an incomplete decentralization process; and 
the fragmentation of the State and civil society.
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO CHARACTERIZE GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEMS
Definition of governance problems
Actors address the problems of governance in different ways according to their 
place in society, their objectives and the pressures they are under. Therefore, the 
first stage is to acknowledge the diversity of viewpoints. Hence, in considering 
what the major issue is in an MPA, ecologists see fish resource overexploitation. 
Indigenous populations see access to these resources and the control of fishing 
grounds. State authorities focus on the balance between conservation and economic 
development and the maintenance of social harmony. In order to be functional, 
the analytical framework should be able to express the problems identified (e.g. 
falling fish catches, population densification or non-equitable resource access) in 
sociopolitical terms. Actors are brought to go beyond what they consider to be a 
problem and see it, inter alia, as a sociological and political issue.
The case of the Banc d’Arguin National Park illustrates the diverse ways in 
which governance problems are addressed. For scientists, the governance problem 
is the low capacity of the management institution to persuade a dependent and 
heterogeneous population – whose tradition does not require, as a main task, 
the forecasting and planning of natural resource use – to accept the principles of 
regulation and conservation of a fragile environment. For the administration of the 
MPA and its partners (NGOs and international donor agencies), the governance 
problem is that of improving the legal and institutional framework, strengthening 
the management plan, building mutual trust and understanding, and making 
participatory mechanisms part of the institutional system. For residents, who may 
not have a unified vision of the problem posed by governance (given the diversity 
of interests at stake and the heterogeneity of the actors concerned), the governance 
problem is defined in terms of opportunity benefits: What is the compensation for 
loss of income caused by the regulation of fishing and, more generally, of natural 
13 An “instrumentalized” governance system is a system that those to be governed take opportunity 
of, and use, to reach objectives of their own, different from (or in addition to) those aimed at by the 
administration.
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resource exploitation? For non-resident users, particularly tourists, the objective 
of governance is that of biodiversity and landscape conservation (Cheikh, 2009).
Generally, demography stands out among the most important governance 
problems in LDC MPAs. In the first place, the issue is to curtail population 
growth, which requires including areas that are often isolated into governmental 
family-planning programmes. A second problem is to limit the seasonal migration 
of non-residents and prohibit uncontrolled offshore fishing, which requires the 
strict and complete application of resource access regulations to all the actors in 
the value chain (from the fisher to the trader).
Another major problem affecting governance of LDC MPAs is the considerable 
development of artisanal fisheries in the last 30 years. This has usually meant 
fishing overcapacity and has led, as in West Africa, to full exploitation and to 
the overexploitation of certain stocks since the end of the 1990s (Gascuel and 
Laurans, 2001; CECAF, 2004). The case of West Africa illustrates the considerable 
increase in artisanal fishing effort and processing within and at the periphery of 
MPAs at the instigation of development projects funded within the framework of 
bilateral or multilateral development aid. The solution to this problem requires the 
integration of MPAs into sectoral policies, for example in fisheries policy, in order 
to anticipate the problems related to artisanal fisheries development projects at the 
periphery of MPAs or induced by the mobility of non-residents.
Finally, a governance problem for most LDC MPAs is the significant 
extraversion of their economies owing to trade deregulation and liberalization. 
The analysis of the modalities of the deregulation and economic extraversion of 
these areas showed that overriding market forces operate within them, affecting 
the residents of protected areas and increasing pressure on natural resources. In 
order to counteract this negative impact, one option for the public authorities is 
to mediate and to restore the regulation of flows of goods between protected areas 
and non-protected zones.
Description of governance norms
Three types of norms can be distinguished, each relating to a different analytical 
level: (i) meta norms, relating to principles guiding the “social contract” and 
to broadly shared values that may be of international inspiration (sustainable 
development, responsible fishing, and participatory management) or of local 
inspiration (clan, tribe and lineage affiliation); (ii) constitutive norms, which define 
organizational and institutional mechanisms; and (iii) regulatory norms, which 
define rules of conduct specifying what is appropriate in terms of behaviour from 
a social point of view.
Norms can be formulated at different levels and transferred to other levels, for 
example from the international level to the national or local level. At each level, there 
is a process of reaction, rejection or acceptance and adaptation. The norms may be 
formal (recognized by the authorities of the relevant society) or informal (produced 
by actors’ practices). These various norms may overlap, compete or coexist in a 
given society, and this normative plurality may become a major source of conflict.
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For example, in the Banc d’Arguin National Park, norms are produced by the 
park authorities using the meta norms from relevant international NGOs as well as 
norms from tribal hierarchies. This unicity in norm production is clear even though 
some competition develops between ministries and state agencies concerning park 
governance. However, a deeper analysis of norm production reveals that natural-
resource access and use regulation is far more administered by the State, via the 
park authorities, than contracted out with control mechanisms, confirming the 
fact that regulatory activities are undertaken solely by the authority of the State. 
The unicity in norm production (an exclusive mandate of the park authorities) 
is made possible by deliberation mechanisms that are instrumentalized by tribal 
hierarchies, and which tend to reinforce a potentially deleterious patron–client14 
relation between the park populations and their representatives or delegates.
Tribal hierarchies are placed at the centre of the decision-making mechanisms, 
but the contemporary context is also characterized by the restructuring of tribal 
territories, in particular with the creation of new human settlements. Although 
authority is expressed through a strong state presence and traditional hierarchies 
throughout the different levels of governance, it also emanates from external 
partners that, in a context of insufficient state resources, more or less deliberately 
increase the dependence of the populations on them (Cheikh, 2009).
Classification of the governance actors
In order to analyse the interactions between actors involved in MPA governance, 
a typology can be made from their classification, according to: their origin (civil 
society, formal or informal sector, State); the community they belong to (affiliation, 
membership, administration); their organization (deliberative or not, bureaucratic, 
market-based); and their social commitment (voluntary or hierarchical).
The typology can be enriched by a supplementary classification. Strategic 
actors are any individual, organization or group with sufficient power resources 
to prevent or hinder the application of rules or the decision-making process 
and the implementation of solutions for collective conflicts. Relevant actors are 
those involved in the institutional framework and have the resources required for 
playing a role. Finally, secondary actors are those that lack sufficient power to 
have an impact on the rules of the game (Prats, 2001).
Based on this typology, some civil-society actors can be identified. Within 
and around MPAs, the major active actors from civil society are coastal or island 
communities (mainly fishers, farmers and informal sector workers) organized into 
village committees, as well as sector-based associations and local and international 
NGOs. Coastal and island communities can be considered as complex and deeply 
embedded arrangements of people with kinship, generational, religious, economic 
and political ties. Residents of an MPA are defined by their unintentional belonging 
14 The term “patron” is used in a negative sense to stress that fact that the assistance, or provision of 
services or advantages, is given to people in return for their support, creating a dependence between 
“patrons” and “clients” that may deviate the institutions from serving societal, collective objectives 
to serving particular interests.
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to coastal or island communities, their intentional and voluntary membership 
in village committees, and their market-related and voluntary membership in 
producer associations. The local and international NGOs involved (e.g. the World 
Wide Fund for Nature [WWF] and the IUCN supported by international donors) 
are very focused on conservation policies and development or cultural heritage 
policies for local communities. Local NGOs can be likened to mediators or, in 
some cases, to “development brokers”.
In the Arabian-Muslim countries and in the Horn of Africa (e.g. Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Mauritania, Somalia, the Sudan and, Yemen), in MPAs where human 
activities are tolerated, the strategic actors are the tribal chiefs, as tribal affiliation 
plays a decisive founding role in natural-resource-use rights and, more generally, 
is a key element of governance. Human communities identify themselves with one 
“tribe” (qabîla) defined as a group, of varying size, of persons whose members 
are linked by kinship, solidarity or allegiance. The unity of the tribal group 
is conveyed through a number of common prerogatives, such as the claim to 
ownership or control of the same territory or the participation of adult males in 
collective obligations, as well as in the assembly that deliberates on community 
affairs including those related to access to natural resources.
In a few sub-Saharan African LDCs, in MPAs that are not classified as strict 
natural reserves, the clans, chiefs and age classes are the strategic governance 
actors. These traditional hierarchies continue to play an important role in the 
coastal and marine protected areas of Angola, Benin, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Affiliation to groups such as clans, chiefs and 
age classes is the basis for natural-resource access and use rights and for MPA 
governance in general.
The same applies to MPAs in the South Pacific LDCs (Kiribati, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu). For example, in the Aleipata and Safata 
MPAs in the Samoan islands, the governance system highlights the role played 
by the clans (aigai) and the lineage chiefs (matai) who are responsible for the 
natural resources and represent the clan in the village council (fono). The fono is 
responsible for community order and the organization and development of the 
village. The national government adds to this structure by appointing a village 
mayor (pulenu’u) who presides over the village council. This governance system is 
strengthened by the 1990 Village Fono Act, which acknowledges the delegation of 
legal, judicial and executive powers to village councils (Techera, 2006). The village 
council appoints a coordinating committee to manage the conservation area. 
Meanwhile, as in other South Pacific island countries, the church is another major 
governance institution, and pastors or priests have considerable influence over 
village life. In addition, the Women’s Committee and the Untitled Men’s (taulelea) 
Association are also involved.
In other MPAs, traditional hierarchies such as clans, age groups and chiefs 
have been significantly undermined. This is the case of sub-Saharan LDC MPAs 
(Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Senegal, Togo and the United 
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Republic of Tanzania) and of South or Southeast Asian LDC MPAs (Bangladesh, 
Cambodia and Myanmar).
Identification of nodal points where actors’ strategies may clash
Nodal points are spaces, either physical (e.g. a community council or a negotiating 
table) or virtual (e.g. an Internet conference), where problems converge, actors 
interact, decisions are made, agreements are concluded and norms are established. 
The nodal point is an observation space where the actors’ distinct visions and 
interests meet. This notion is close to the notion of “arena” developed by the 
socioanthropology of mediations and brokerage (Olivier de Sardan, 1998). 
Governance may involve several nodal points, or a principal nodal point with 
inter-related secondary ones. For example, during negotiations on the allocation 
of access rights, each represented group holds internal discussions to determine 
the group’s strategy, during which different actors argue but end up aggregating 
their demands or positions in preparation for the main negotiation. Identifying 
and characterizing the different nodal points is part of the analysis of existing 
governance conditions. The main governance nodal points in West African 
coastal and marine protected areas are the governing boards and the management 
committees, the village or community committees, the customary assemblies, 
the professional associations, and the concertation workshops. It may be noted 
that, on the whole, the nodal points tend to evolve from the traditional to a more 
formalized framework.
Among the most identifiable nodal points of the governance of the Banc 
d’Arguin National Park are the concertation workshops periodically organized 
by the park management in order to discuss with the representatives of the MPA 
populations the issues that require their involvement or their consent, e.g. related 
to regulations or local development initiatives. The concertation workshop is 
the crossroads where the whole variety of local ideas and interests of resident 
populations meet and face the resolve of the administration with the view to 
integrate these ideas and interests into the process of ownership, with the aim 
of contributing and ensuring the conservation of the natural heritage on which 
they live and their livelihood depends. The divergent expectations emerging from 
these workshops are central to the difficulties faced by the governance of the 
Banc d’Arguin National Park. The workshop is precisely the place where these 
difficulties are brought out and debated. Connected to this first nodal point, the 
cooperative is another focal point between divergent interests that acts as the 
“transmission shaft” between projects and MPA resident populations.
In the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve in Guinea-Bissau, there 
has not been such a clear formalization of the customary framework. In each village 
or geopolitical entity, the nodal points remain the council of elders and other 
traditional assemblies, during which decisions are made. These are accompanied 
by ritual ceremonies, which play a role in social regulation and in particular in 
exorcizing conflicts (Henry, 1994). However, these ceremonies also play their part 
in maintaining the gerontocracy that perpetuates the domination of the elders 
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through the control of resource access and especially of the labour force (Da 
Silva, 2003). The evolution of nodal points towards a more formalized framework 
remains localized and depends mainly on the efforts made towards participatory 
management; as a result, it is more noticeable in the islands of Formosa, Nago and 
Tchedia, which constitute the Urok Community-based MPA.
Reconstruction of the process that led to the governance system
The process is seen here as a succession of states through which the governance 
system evolves. One method of analysing the process is to identify the sequences 
of governance, introducing a temporal dimension.
For example, 1998 was a pivotal year in the case of the Banc d’Arguin National 
Park. It marked the transition from a barely and only seasonally occupied marine 
area governed on the basis of a top-down paradigm, to a governance system 
integrating concertation mechanisms potentially capable of dealing with threats 
such as: increasingly sedentary (less migratory) populations; greater fishing effort 
(motorized outside the park and non-motorized inside it) owing to regional and 
international market pressure; greater access to the park facilitated by the increase 
in four-wheel drive vehicles and, more recently, the tarring of the road between 
Nouakchott and Nouadhibou; and the threat of offshore oil and gas drilling. Since 
1998, the concertation mechanisms, the objectives of which relate to resource 
access and sharing new fisheries wealth, have awakened the traditional tribal 
organization.
Another method to analyse the governance process is to draw the web of 
interactions between actors. The drawing combines four types of interactions: 
(i) bargaining transactions, which determine the collective rules related to the 
transfer of a right (e.g. the access to fish resources); (ii) managing transactions, 
which organize the production of goods and services (e.g. the exploitation of 
resources); (iii) rationing transactions, which organize the distribution of the 
wealth produced based on the principle of allegiance to the authority; and (iv) 
reciprocity transactions, which strengthen the social fabric and are the foundations 
of the social capital (Beaurain and Bertrand, 2009).
One example of such transactions are those observed in April 2003 during the 
installation of a fishing camp in Ancopado in the Orango National Park (Guinea-
Bissau) between Diola fishers coming from the northern coast of Guinea-Bissau 
and the indigenous populations of the village of Eticoga, who claimed territorial 
control (Da Silva, 2003). The negotiation transaction concerned the composition 
of the committee bringing together decision-makers from both sides and the 
modalities of decision-making and transfer of rights. It was decided to establish a 
committee of five representatives, three from the indigenous village and two from 
the non-native fishers, and that the transfer of a right of access or exploitation 
of a resource would occur during ceremonies presided over by the priestess of 
the village. The managing transaction led to limiting the number of canoes and 
fishing gear according to the target species, the definition of zones where fishing 
was prohibited, and to designation of compulsory days of rest in keeping with 
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Bijogo cosmogony. Rationing transactions dealt with the quantities to be given 
to the village chief and the council of elders as well as the species and quantities 
over which the women of the village would have commercial monopoly. An 
example of reciprocity transaction related to the settlement authorization is given 
by the rental of canoes at preferential rates – allowing the village women to trade 
their processed fish on the weekly market of Bubaque, the main town of the 
Archipelago – and the provision, at the request of the council of elders, of a large 
canoe from the fishing camp to evacuate the sick and injured to Bubaque.
The case of a hierarchical and instrumentalized governance system: the 
Banc d’Arguin National Park 
The Banc d’Arguin National Park is an example of an MPA where governance 
is strongly influenced by tribal affiliation. The Imraguens who inhabit the Park 
were originally a dominated class, once comprising former slaves, tributaries 
and artisans holding their use and access rights (including maritime rights) 
from a tribal framework. The tribe continues to determine mentalities, to foster 
exclusions (in particular matrimonial ones) and to establish powers. The way in 
which the park’s resident households are formed and composed is provided in 
the general tribal system, which presides over resource access. Within the tribal 
framework, access regulation is based first and foremost on the assertion of a 
use right for water points, pastoral itineraries and fishing grounds based on the 
claim of the past dependence of Imraguens who used to occupy the coast on a 
seasonal basis to fish for mullet. The strategic actors, who are the chiefs of tribal 
groups or their representatives, make commitments and decisions in the name of 
others, taking their authority from within the tribal framework. These are also 
the actors who draw the most benefit from means and resources provided by 
external interventions, even though redistribution mechanisms generally temper 
the predatory behaviour of these “development brokers” (Cheikh, 2003).
However, even though the State, through the park administration, exercises its 
duty of regulation by delegating some of its functions to traditional hierarchies 
of the MPA, it has the final say, particularly when tribal conciliation fails. This is 
especially the case because the State is in charge of the control function, exclusively 
undertaken by park or state officials, while social organizations have no recognized 
competence in this domain. It is the park administration and state services that 
transmit the meta norms advocated by international NGOs. The administration 
is tempted to operate according to the prevailing top-down paradigm, the only 
one it really “masters”, but it often runs up against the weight of networks of 
influence and counterbalancing powers of tribal and regional origin from which 
this administration draws (more or less covertly) some of its legitimacy (Cheikh, 
2003; Dahou et al., 2004).
Because of its financial importance, the International Foundation for the Banc 
d’Arguin (FIBA) can be seen as an informal supervisor of the park administration. 
The residents of the Banc d’Arguin National Park are tempted to deal directly 
with the FIBA because of its strong presence on the ground, possibly bypassing 
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the administration. As regards bilateral cooperations, the residents deal practically 
only with the park central administration but they compete with one another and 
with the FIBA and this does not always foster coherence among the different 
projects on the ground. Finally, the “experts”, especially those who manage to 
stay for long periods in Mauritania and are, in principle, serving a rational and 
ecological vision of local realities, cannot escape from a patronizing reading of the 
problems.
The arguments of legitimacy or the justifications used by the different actors 
reveal divergences, convey antagonisms, and mobilize solicitations and odd 
alliances, which gives the governance system of the Banc d’Arguin National Park 
its specificity as a hierarchical and instrumentalized governance system. The 
Imraguen populations work towards strengthening their position of recipients 
of international aid, stressing sometimes the “compensations” they feel entitled 
to for the loss of earnings resulting from the statutory constraints enacted by the 
administration (Cheikh, 2009).
The main governance weakness is the truncated representation of dependent 
groups that are nonetheless the direct users of the natural resources. This 
representation tends to marginalize many actors that are neither visible in the 
tribal organization nor in the representation systems initiated by international 
NGOs and institutions. Thus, the participatory methods promoted by donor 
agencies do not always lead to a true associative movement. The poor visibility 
of resident populations can contribute, ultimately, to increased pressure exerted 
on the resources by actors located at the park’s periphery, in particular artisanal 
fishers, who claim fishing rights in the park’s waters inasmuch as no significant 
mobilization contrasts their predatory intentions (Cheikh, 2003; Dahou et al., 
2004).
The case of a community-based concession system: the Bolama Bijagos 
Archipelago Biosphere Reserve
The governance system of the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve is 
based on the devolution of regulatory powers concerning resource access and use 
to traditional institutions. These institutions refer to the social organization of 
Bijogo society – every villager belongs to a clan and to one of eight age groups, the 
last of which provides members of the council of elders. The identification with 
an insular geopolitical entity relates first of all to the village, which is the property 
of one of the four matrilineal clans of the archipelago. The “king”, assisted by the 
priestess, heads the hierarchy of the village or group of villages and “possesses”, 
in the religious sense of the term, the collective assets of the village: the land, the 
beach and the proximate aquatic spaces. He also chairs the council of elders, which 
brings together the “great men” (the oldest age group) to grant land-use rights 
or to authorize the settlement of foreign fisher communities (Mendes Fernandes, 
1984, 1989; Henry, 1994).
The rights to access and use fishery resources are granted and implemented 
in various ways. Use rights for fish resources located near the villages are only 
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regulated: (i) when large fish traps are built; (ii) for specific fisheries, in the form 
of technical restrictions concerning hooks or mesh sizes for mullet nets; and 
(iii) for certain ceremonies during which the “elders” forbid canoe owners from 
fishing in the coastal zone surrounding the sacred sites. As regards the use rights 
of purely maritime fish resources, the customary hierarchies have no recognized 
role, as the State is supposed to exercise its sovereignty over the maritime space of 
the exclusive economic zone. The fishing rights in the intertidal zone are set aside 
for the women of the village and give rise to seasonal collective harvesting led by 
the “elder women”.
This community-based concession system, based on the prevailing mutual 
trust paradigm characterized by a broad involvement of the stakeholders in the 
management process, is encouraged by the public authorities insofar as a land 
law recognizes and endorses all the customary rights. On the other hand, state 
governance in the reserve is practically absent – deconcentrated administrations 
seem broadly absent from insular territories and maritime zones. This situation 
is not specific of the archipelago, as, given the lack of state resources, the 
administration of citizens remains relatively loose over the whole territory of 
Guinea-Bissau. Therefore, this is definitely a case of the principle of the devolution 
of access rights to territories and resources to local populations, with no guarantee, 
however, from any higher authority, as to their public nature. Incidentally, the 
process is enhanced by the numerous interventions by national and international 
NGOs, first by the IUCN and the FIBA, heavily involved in the governance of 
the reserve and directly financing some of the archipelago communities.
In the case of fishing, this community-based concession system is ambiguous 
insofar as the traditional institutions are unable to control efficiently the 
access to and the exploitation of fish resources. Both autochthonous and non-
autochthonous fishing coexist in the case of Bijagos. These two types of resource 
exploitation operate either together or separately depending on the fishing sites. 
One of the reasons is the absence of the State to enforce the law and guarantee 
the settlements authorized by law and to call into question illegal ones. As a 
consequence, some fishing camps develop into proto-urban settlements that 
threaten the reserve environment. Even when such tensions are moderate, e.g. 
in particular in the case of offshore fishing from Senegal in MPAs, out of any 
community control, the State’s lack of resources is indirectly responsible for the 
increase in predatory fishing.
This highlights the main weakness in the governance of this community-based 
concession system: the lack of resources of traditional institutions to exercise 
control over the maritime territory, together with the weak linkages between 
traditional and state powers. To remedy this weakness, norms for resource 
access and use could be jointly established by the residents and the State. Such 
cooperation could be supported by international NGOs and institutions that have 
the resources to generate the necessary mechanisms (Da Silva, 2003; Dahou et al., 
2004).
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WEAKNESSES OF MPA GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN LEAST-DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES
The limits of fisheries management
Conventional fishery management generally limits the stakes of governance to a 
functional mechanism whose objective is to conserve fishery resources (Hatcher 
and Robinson, 1999). Analyses in terms of fisheries management usually bring 
only technical or economic solutions to problems involving power struggles 
between actors that, in that approach, remain neglected. On the contrary, a 
political economy or political science approach to management would be more 
willing to address the conflicts between the divergent interests that characterize 
the governance of MPAs.
Therefore, fisheries managers usually think of the management of an MPA only 
in terms of appropriate or inappropriate economic incentives or bioecological 
properties and/or issues and do not pay sufficient attention to the power struggles 
along the value chain that largely determine the way in which socio-economic 
issues are appropriated and norms are applied.
The non-recognition of territorial access and use rights15 of MPA residents 
by highly mobile migrant fishers is another limit to the fisheries management 
approach, which only rarely takes into account the overlapping of different fishers’ 
territories or migration paths. For example, the fishing migrations and interactions 
between MPAs show the difficulty of establishing territorial limits, and yet, the 
management of these migrations and interactions represents one of the principal 
challenges for local governance that has to integrate the various scales and manage 
interactions between the groups operating within and at the periphery of MPAs.
In West Africa, the governance of an MPA is usually only analysed in terms 
of its fisheries management dimensions. This governance model focuses on 
understanding the biological, and perhaps the economic or ecosystemic, impact 
of measures specific to these areas, which reduces the possibility to integrate 
any elements other than the “catch” and gear dimensions into the analysis. 
It is difficult for such a narrow approach to integrate the impacts of trade 
on removals, or in social, economic or political terms (increased inequality, 
redistribution of value-added, etc.). The conventional “fishery” management 
model turns out to be too narrowly sectoral to “capture” properly the complex 
scope of this type of area.
By modelling essentially the removals taken from ecosystems, the fishery 
management approach to MPA management promotes only the functions needed 
to control those removals. By characterizing exploitation systems simplistically, 
if at all, this approach prevents understanding of the practices of the group of 
actors and of the degree of equity in these systems. As a result, this approach alone 
cannot suggest how to achieve environmental, economic and social sustainability 
objectives.
15 The term used in French is “déterritorialisation”.
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The lack of financial sustainability
In LDCs, MPA governance is usually hindered by low, unsustainable and unstable 
levels of funding. Several funding sources can be distinguished (Reid-Grant and 
Bhat, 2009). The low level of government subsidies can be explained by the fact 
that it chooses as a priority to finance the basic needs or to clear its international 
debt. The unsustainable nature of the funding is the mark of foundation grants 
given to NGOs working on MPAs for specific projects of fixed duration and that 
cannot usually be used for daily management activities.
The interannual instability of funding is illustrated by donations, which 
are an important source of funds for some of the West African coastal and 
marine protected areas. Other MPA funding sources, such as concessions and 
biodiversity enterprise, remain marginal in LDCs. Concessions granted to private 
entrepreneurs provide revenue for the running of MPAs but may open the way 
to legal appropriations that could then be difficult to reverse. The funds from 
private firms interested in biodiversity originate generally from pharmaceutical 
companies searching for chemicals or ready to pay for conservation of their 
potential sources.
The best guarantors of some longer-term funding are international assistance 
agencies, debt swaps and trust funds. The Global Environment Facility, for 
example, is intended for governments and not for NGOs, meaning that funds 
transit through government bureaucracies. As noted in Senegal, this may lead to 
lower efficiency. International financial assistance can also take the form of debt 
swaps,16 which supposes that the benefiting MPA has the qualified personnel to 
follow through on the agreement. Finally, the trust funds, which are a relatively 
long-term source of funding, require that the following conditions be met: the 
existence of a planning process and a management plan with regular budgeting, 
annual reporting, business plan, institutional and organizational development plan; 
and a consolidated and transparent accounting system including externally audited 
annual accounts. A recent development in LDC MPAs are trust funds. One of 
the best known in West Africa is that of the Banc d’Arguin, implemented on the 
initiative of the FIBA and of the Government of Mauritania (FIBA, 2008).
Finally, the introduction of user fees clashes with the low income of fishers 
and other users who often generate only a low, perhaps even negative, resource 
rent, explaining why such fees are practically never applied to residents of LDC 
protected areas. However, several studies have shown that the potential of entrance 
fees, licences and permits were often underestimated and that they could make a 
significant contribution to management costs (in particular surveillance costs) 
provided that the flow of tourists were substantial and the area to protect not too 
extensive (Depondt and Green, 2006; Thur, 2010).
16 A debt swap is the conversion of an old debt into a new debt, a new equity, or a series of transactions 
where debts are exchanged between two entities. Here, the suggestion is that some part of the 
sovereign debt of an LDC could possibly be swapped for a long-term financing by that State of its 
management of MPAs.
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The disproportionate role of international NGOs and institutions
The analysis of LDC MPA governance systems highlights the disproportionate 
role of international NGOs and foundations (the IUCN, WWF, FIBA, etc.), 
and of other international institutions that, through their programme funding, 
effectively establish themselves as power holders in the environmental field.
The logic behind the development activities of these international NGOs and 
institutions is to promote deliberative bodies with the view to promote a group of 
actors. As a result, they do not usually strengthen government-based management 
of these areas. They try to limit the weight of the top-down governance paradigm 
by focusing their resources on the organization of local populations. While 
strengthening community organizations, they do not appear to bother about 
balancing power relationships within and between communities. This can lead 
to deficient regulation of conflicts over resource access and use and incoherent 
management. Thus, these international NGOs and institutions sometimes tend 
to promote a conservationist approach to the detriment of a wider vision of 
sustainable development by not providing the necessary resources to mitigate or 
compensate the restrictions.
Incomplete decentralization and institutional fragmentation
In LDCs, MPA governance is strongly influenced by the general institutional 
context of decentralization. Initiated by international institutions and relayed 
by bilateral cooperation agencies, the decentralization policy was implemented 
in almost all LDCs in the 1990s. However, one can speak of incomplete 
decentralization insofar as the administration of local communities has not been 
wholly empowered and decentralization has been limited to certain areas of 
competence, within the framework of a relationship with the central power based 
on deconcentration or sometimes even on sheer centralization (Galletti, 2003). 
Hence, LDC MPA governance stumbles, on the one hand, on absent or incomplete 
decentralization, as shown by the lack or insufficient fiscal prerogatives of local 
authorities, and, on the other hand, the insufficient deconcentration processes by 
a State tending to keep all strategic decisions at this level, helped by its grip over 
most of the fiscal resources.
In LDCs, MPA governance is also hindered by excessive fragmentation of 
the State and the civil society. State fragmentation emerges in three ways: (i) in 
the adoption by state institutions of norms that may be contradictory, e.g. in 
environmental protection and poverty reduction strategies; (ii) in interministerial 
competition at the national level, leading to compartmentalized projects; and (iii) 
in the coordination problems emerging at the local level between deconcentrated 
administrative services, reducing the development of complementarities. State 
fragmentation is a serious obstacle to the promotion of a sustainable development, 
as the different administrations constantly oscillate between conservationist and 
developmental approaches.
The multiplication of local NGOs and associations illustrates the fragmentation 
of civil society. Their diverse objectives and difficult coordination seriously 
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compromise the horizontal governance that should be based on the mutual trust 
paradigm. In the three areas studied, coordination problems may be identified 
at the heart of these two power structures (i.e. the State and civil society) that 
undermine the efficiency of the current concertation mechanisms (Weigel and 
Dahou, 2007).
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6. The reconfiguration of MPA 
governance and public policies
Bertrand Cazalet
There is an urgent need to restructure LDC MPA governance given the 
weaknesses highlighted in governance systems. First, such restructuring should 
begin by reviewing all the various authorities and sources of law that, de facto, 
define MPA governance. Second, law-based governance should be formalized, 
which involves the necessary reform of the State and the emergence of civil society 
in order to compensate for governance weaknesses. The changes required in the 
ways in which governance functions concern not only the adjustment of legal 
and institutional statuses but also the means of implementation, endorsing the 
decentralization processes and recognizing and guaranteeing territorial-use rights. 
The restructuring of governance must allow protected areas to become a strategic 
tool in national environment policies. Hence, the following sections discuss the 
integration of the management of these areas into other sectoral policies and the 
development of planned and managed ecotourism.
THE AUTHORITIES AND SOURCES OF LAW
State authorities
The analysis of their objectives and functions has highlighted the fact that MPAs 
are usually defined as state-controlled circumscribed spaces. The act of creating a 
protected area includes the definition of the geographic limits of its territory and 
the constitution of a public institutional management structure whose main mission 
is to administer the protected area with the power at its disposal. The management 
system may be completed by policing prerogatives granted to other state services 
that produce regulations in support of conservation (authorizations, bans, 
restrictions, coercions and sanctions). The analysis of governance systems in West 
African coastal and marine protected areas identifies functional decentralization 
(e.g. in the Banc d’Arguin National Park), administrative deconcentration (e.g. 
in the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve), and territorial decentralization with a 
weak supervisory institutional structure (e.g. in the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago 
Biosphere Reserve).
Customary and decentralized authorities
In LDCs, the existence of traditional authorities is sometimes recognized given 
their unquestionable legitimacy and influence, but these authorities have little legal 
power. In the case of West Africa for example, customary property and related 
uses appear as a division of the collective property usually established at the village 
level. At the heart of this socio-economic entity, traditional authorities regulate, 
control and ensure access to, and the use of, land and sea areas. The exploitation 
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of natural resources for food determines the distribution of territories with an 
initial goal of achieving balance and equity between inhabitants. The ancient origin 
of villages and the delimitation of their territories go back to the settlement of a 
founding clan claiming ownership over a site based on the right of first clearer or 
first occupant. This results in very complex land appropriation rules, subject to 
interpretation within the village society, but also between several neighbouring 
communities as well as with external migrants seeking seasonal or permanent 
settlement. Furthermore, traditional land regimes do not concern only the strict 
“land” domain, and have to be understood in the broader sense of the term “land”, 
including watercourses, lagoons, and coastal, insular and maritime zones. Hence, 
they often govern all economic activities: agriculture, agroforestry, cattle-raising, 
hunting, fisheries and so on.
In the light of this situation, how can these traditional institutions be 
recognized and allowed to acquire de jure the prerogatives that they exercise de 
facto? Officially, the State promotes territorial decentralization through which it 
gives up some of its functions, transferring them to elected local authorities. These 
constitutional reforms are intended to provide extra credit to the traditional arena, 
while modernizing the relationships between central and peripheral institutions 
in the nation’s interest and future. In reality, however, decentralized institutions 
were often put into place with the objective of strengthening the presence of the 
State in the peripheral territories and to isolate further the traditional powers. 
When dealing with MPAs, it is very important to take this issue of incomplete 
decentralization into account, especially in a context where local governance is 
presented as a new ideal of sustainable resource-use management. The State is 
quite often intrinsically reluctant towards any initiative that is geographically and 
politically removed from its influence and domination.
Ambiguous authorities
“Ambiguous” authorities are authorities that do not derive their influence from 
an official or direct legal competence or from a particular traditional legitimacy, 
but rather from their political and, especially, financial, power. In the first place, 
they are the many private economic operators, such as the influential stakeholders, 
groups and cooperatives, and other agents in the fisheries, agriculture and tourism 
value chains. Second, there are the NGOs and the international pressure groups, 
mainly concerned with the environmental aspects and whose stance guides the 
managers of protected areas. They have two decisive arguments that give them 
very significant lobbying power: (i) a scientific expertise and research capacity that 
gives them scientific credibility; and (ii) an omnipresent financial contribution. 
The systematic motto of these NGOs and international pressure groups is to “pull 
conservation down towards the grassroots”, which is one of the leitmotifs of good 
MPA governance, as defined during the World Parks Congress of September 2003. 
Principle 2 and Operational Guideline 4 of the Man and Biosphere Committee of 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
also recommends decentralizing “the initiative as much as possible towards 
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the base” (UNESCO, 2000). This constitutes one of the foundations for the 
ecosystem approach presented by UNESCO as “solving the puzzle” of biosphere 
reserve management. The movement towards some form of subsidiarity and the 
introduction of new community, or community-based, principles provides strong 
guidance for ongoing and future projects.
LEGAL FORMALIZATION OF GOVERNANCE
Necessary reform of the State
Stressing the inefficiency of LDC governance systems, the promoters of good 
governance recommend working with other structures and other methods in order 
to share skills and confer new powers to civil society. In short, good governance 
aims to reform the state apparatus well beyond the strict framework of protected 
areas. Nonetheless, the issues that are special to MPAs require further research 
and the practical testing of good governance objectives. The transformations of 
the state apparatus aim at changing the organization of politico-administrative 
arrangements. From a political point of view, the aim is an effective separation 
of powers while, quite often, the situation of power accumulation persists. From 
the point of view of administrative organization, centralization is criticized as 
responsible for heaviness and sluggishness of conceptualization, elaboration and 
implementation of political decisions. Therefore, the aim is to end centralization 
in order to strengthen the efficiency of public action and to increase the neutrality 
of the State in public management.
In the environmental domain, and specifically as regards protected areas, 
the ideology of good governance reduces the role and place of the State in the 
decision-making process. International statements increasingly tend to minimize 
the capacity of States to act for environmental and biodiversity conservation. The 
issue of governance poses clearly the problem of the evolution of the place of the 
State in the decision-making process. Governance, including that of MPAs, should 
be stable and part of a dynamic process changing the balance and weighting in the 
distribution of skills towards lower levels of decision-making.
The necessary consolidation of civil society
In all LDCs, a duality persists between the “applied” (real) law that has always 
existed and resisted since the colonial period, and state, legal and constitutional 
(formal) law. This situation may be observed in many circumstances, and the 
original models derived from this law constitute forms of governance. The 
unilateral nature of state norms, patronage, and the fact that executive powers 
have the monopoly over administrative “violence” are all factors of dissent that 
promote the emergence and consolidation of the civil society.
Research undertaken in West African coastal and marine protected areas has 
highlighted a legal syncretism that is not an exclusive property of the law applied 
in protected areas but is instead a phenomenon observed in most LDCs. In these 
countries, the State and its administration negotiate with the civil society in order 
to achieve their objectives. This negotiation illustrates the revival of societal rights 
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and, more generally, the vitality of a civil society that is confronted with the state 
legal takeover of the social space. This negotiated law illustrates the transformation 
of management models imported from the West. Proposals for MPA governance 
must take into account the syncretic nature of the legal system and the underlying 
need to consolidate the civil society.
THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE MODUS OPERANDI
Adjustment of institutional and legal statuses
The adjustment of institutional and legal statuses of protected areas does not mean 
that these should be radically called into question. These are, on the whole, well 
established, comprehensive and, in theory, have the legal means needed for their 
implementation. The main problem is the applicability of “top-down” management 
measures imposed by authorities whose legitimacy and efficacy are called into 
question. The direct involvement of populations and their representatives should 
help to re-balance the governance processes.
Breaking down the barriers between conservation and economic activities 
should be encouraged: (i) through the adoption and application of texts and 
decrees that regulate downstream economic activities (e.g. fish processing and 
trade) to avoid negative impacts on exploitation rates or distribution of benefits; 
(ii) through the redefinition of the role of cooperatives or producer associations as 
vectors of conservation and socio-economic development, and the revision of their 
responsibilities; (iii) through the creation of socio-economic observatories of MPAs 
in order to assess their capacity to adapt to conservation-related constraints, and to 
understand the social dynamics in order to better aim ongoing and future projects.
It seems desirable to institute a planning structure in order to bring together 
all the actors and to strengthen governance coherence in each MPA. Within this 
structure, representatives from central administrations can play a significant role, 
correcting the lack of relationship and cooperation with actors from the civil 
society, which often prefer to turn to external donor agencies to develop their 
local projects. However, in order to position itself as a leader, the State must first 
regain its legitimacy and its efficiency. Its efficiency is directly related, on the one 
hand, to its human, logistical and financial capacities – and the example of West 
Africa shows how impoverished States are – and, on the other hand, to reducing 
an omnipresent bureaucracy that overburdens procedures and strains an already 
very limited efficiency. In order to recover greater legitimacy, the functions 
of administrations, including MPA administrations, must evolve beyond their 
present control and repression focus (imposed by their lack of resources), opening 
up to local development programmes and facilitating participatory management 
projects.
New means of action
Complete decentralization
Incomplete decentralization is particularly obvious in all LDCs where the 
process is hampered by a solid tradition of state control that rejects traditional 
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rural communities in favour of technocratic institutions, and leads neither to 
genuine decentralization nor to a return to ancestral land traditions. Some MPAs 
are affected by this failure to complete the decentralization process. Thus, in the 
Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve in Senegal, the new local authorities have the 
autonomy to manage administrative and financial affairs and can design local 
development plans comparable with territorially based public policies. However, 
they do not have the fiscal resources to match their areas of competence, still less 
to fulfil their ambitions.
Another unfinished decentralization process can be observed concerning 
the limits of territorial control. An example is the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago 
Biosphere Reserve in Guinea-Bissau, where the Bijogo communities of the 
archipelago manage, for the most part, their land and coastal areas but do not 
control the maritime zones and the tourism activities, which are managed and 
controlled by the State using fishing licences as well as permits and other taxes on 
tourism. The inadequacy of state control resources means that the fisheries sector 
is dominated by non-resident seasonal migrants who are present in this MPA. 
Although the installation of a fishing camp by immigrants must be authorized by 
the local traditional powers, this constraint has little impact on the management 
of the fishery sector.
Hence, there is a need to complete decentralization and empowerment by 
delegating fiscal powers to the management authorities of MPAs and recognizing 
their terrestrial and maritime territorial control, enabling them to regulate fishing 
capacity and effort when faced with the growing pressure of regional, national or 
international demand for fisheries products.
Recognized and protected territorial-use rights
In LDCs, MPAs aim to achieve simultaneously the objectives of conserving 
biodiversity, maintaining the sustainable economic activity of indigenous 
communities and preserving their culture and heritage. To this end, recommendations 
concerning MPA governance prescribe the implementation of local mechanisms 
that increase the responsibility of direct actors, one element of which is the 
recognition of territorial-use rights.
Exercising use rights must be understood in the broad sense, i.e. with all the 
legal distinctions applicable to maritime, coastal and territorial areas, as a protected 
area covers a multitude of miscellaneous uses, which may be complementary, 
competitive or even conflicting. Most territorial-use rights belong to the category 
of informal rights and are, therefore, vulnerable as they suffer from a lack of 
legal “security” – they can disappear or their nature may change during the 
establishment of an MPA.
A concession can be a way to provide improved legal security for territorial-
use rights. It can be defined as a unilateral (authorization or licence) or bilateral 
(convention and/or contract) legal act whereby the administration grants to 
an individual or a community the benefits of special rights or privileges. The 
concession may concern specific areas, and the term “conceded” territory may 
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then be used. The aim is for territorial-use rights to benefit from both state and 
traditional legitimacy so that beneficiary communities may legally defend their 
rights against non-qualified external actors. A concession is of interest as a means 
to establish community discipline in return for the acquisition of new rights under 
the conditions defined in its specifications. Formalizing disciplinary principles is 
fundamental for enforcement, the surveillance of the activity, the resolution of 
internal conflicts and the fairer distribution of incomes. Often, all these measures 
already exist in MPA regulations but their design, implementation and enforcement 
still depend today essentially on the managing administration.
The first difficulty in reconciling territorial-use rights and economic activities 
concerns the non-recognition of territorial-use rights of residents by the most 
highly mobile segments of the fishing sector. Such canoe fishing activity with 
no traditional territorial linkage is no longer artisanal (for subsistence or small 
commercial production) but follows a commercial and industrial logic.
The second difficulty in reconciling territorial-use rights and economic activities 
is related to cooperative structures that have been promoted in some protected 
areas as they were supposed to convey principles of community discipline. 
Research conducted with the fishers’ cooperatives of West African coastal and 
marine protected areas has shown that they had the tendency to “escape” their 
founding members and to drift significantly towards institutions encouraging a 
poorly controlled increase of resource exploitation. 
In order to reconcile territorial-use rights and economic activities, it seems 
desirable to set up fishing concessions, to develop and respect a code of conduct, 
to control offshore fishing and to promote small cooperatives or producer 
associations that can be controlled by their members.
MARINE PROTECTED AREAS AS TOOLS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
Integration of MPA management into public policies
The term “public policy” must be understood in the broad sense, for example, the 
national policy regarding the environment or land-use planning. As for MPAs, 
their management is closer to sectoral management that is part of a wider public 
policy. External donor agencies (governmental or from NGOs), who are real 
comanagers of MPAs given their missions, resources and contribution, are the 
main sponsors of these ad-hoc approaches that support the choices of those in 
charge. However, the resulting control is more of an internal nature, involving 
verifying that the acts of the institutions comply in their substance, form and 
procedure, contributing only indirectly to the analysis of MPA public policies. 
The integration of MPA management into other public policies calls for the 
participation of local populations.
Another consequence of the affiliation of MPAs with sectoral programmes is 
the weak integration of their management into regional or national public policies. 
At a national level, the integration into poverty reduction strategy papers that 
determines the directions of LDC development policies must be given priority. 
At the regional level, many things work against this integration, such as the lack 
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of harmonization of institutional frameworks, the disparity in natural resource 
conservation policies, or the hindrances to economic integration. For example, 
in West Africa, the absence of regulatory arrangements applicable to migratory 
flows of transboundary populations highlights the weakness in the regional 
coordination of MPA management. Integration would require the development 
of a greater coherence between each programme and regional public policies and 
an improved coordination between the various programmes. It leads to supported 
and structured interstate regional coordination as exemplified by the Sub-Regional 
Fisheries Commission, or to a network-based cooperation such as that developed 
within the framework of the Regional Programme of Coastal and Marine Zone 
Conservation (PRCM).
Governance of MPAs is not limited solely to state action for the general public 
interest outside of the market field of action. Initially, the conservation of the 
environment through the State gradually taking control of a site can be envisaged 
as a mission of general interest. From this viewpoint, the State remains the main 
reference for protected area management policies, and its special responsibility 
should not be underestimated. However, this role is then confronted with the 
very strong dynamics of these protected areas and all the economic and social 
actors present within and outside them. Under their impact, the MPA situation 
evolves continuously and induces, by retroaction, a transformation of the modus 
operandi of the State that is favourable to mutations in the law and the institutions. 
Thus, the integration of MPA management into public policies requires taking 
into account the role of these areas in the transformation of the workings of the 
State, in the law and in the institutions, which is all part of restructuring of their 
governance.
Development of planned and comanaged ecotourism
Since the beginning of the 1990s, ecotourism has appeared as an ideal component of 
a strategy for the sustainable development of MPAs (Agardy, 1993). It is presented 
as an alternative and viable complement to traditional activities, as the wealth 
of fauna and flora in these protected areas, as well as their cultural and heritage 
manifestations, offer an undeniable potential for contemplation and discovery.
The development of ecotourism in LDCs remains at an embryonic stage. It 
has a marginal role when compared with the classical tourism organized and 
controlled by external operators. An overview of ecotourism in West African 
coastal and marine protected areas showed that ecotourist initiatives often remain 
the prerogative of specialized external actors. As a result, direct financial benefits 
generally escape the local populations of these areas and are limited to the returns 
on provision of raw materials of little value, the sale of artisanal products and other 
souvenirs, and seasonal employment as tourist guides or assistants (Deheunynck 
et al., 2004).
The first condition for LDC ecotourism to be seen as an option for public 
policy is for it to be included in a national tourism policy with the objectives 
of removing administrative obstacles and reducing taxation, which is often 
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disproportionately high. The second condition is for ecotourism to take into 
account local needs in terms of education, health and public hygiene, infrastructure 
and telecommunications. Finally, a last condition for ecotourism to become a 
component of a sustainable development strategy in MPAs is the comanagement 
of ecotourism operations that would comply with the respect of indigenous 
population rights in line with Recommendation 25 of the Durban World Parks 
Congress in 2003.
From this perspective and at the national level, the development of ecotourism 
in LDCs must benefit from investments and credit lines in order to strengthen 
its offer and the organizational capacity of MPA residents. It may require the 
implementation of a self-funding mechanism based on an evaluation of the 
willingness-to-pay of visitors to the MPA or of compensation for environmental 
services rendered by MPA communities (Depondt and Green, 2006; Asafu-Adjaye 
and Tapsuwan, 2008; Thur, 2010).
 65
7. Conclusion
Jean-Yves Weigel, François Féral and Bertrand Cazalet
The need for adequate governance of MPAs in LDCs is commensurate to the 
significant territorial stakes created by their extensive maritime zones. Already, a 
significant part of this domain is officially protected as no fewer than 207 marine 
areas cover more than 563 000 km2, with an average area of 2 720 km2. The number 
of MPAs increases every year, mainly with the multiplication of community-based 
MPAs, particularly in the South Pacific and to a lesser extent in West Africa. 
Other challenges are biodiversity conservation (variety and productivity of coral, 
upwelling, estuarine or delta ecosystems) and issues related to identity claims 
based on the process of nature ownership development. However, the overriding 
issue is to reconcile conservation and human presence because human activities are 
tolerated in almost all LDC MPAs.
Prior to characterizing governance systems, the demographic and economic 
constraints faced by the governance and legal context of LDC MPAs must be 
highlighted. Governance of MPAs is subject to a number of constraints, the most 
important of which are demographic and relate to population densification and 
the growing mobility of populations residing inside or at the periphery of the 
areas. This densification is the result of one of the highest birth rates in the world; 
for example, in West African LDCs, at current rates, the rural population will 
double every 25 years. The increased population mobility over the last 30 years 
can be explained in part by the expansion in fishing capacity and in particular by 
the increase in the number of boats and by motorization.
However, in LDCs, MPA governance also faces two main economic constraints 
related to deregulation. The first one is the unchecked intensification of 
natural-resource exploitation (in fisheries, forestry, agriculture and agroforestry). 
Deregulation has resulted in a drastic reduction in public intervention tools and 
in administrations that now lack the resources to control this intensification. This 
illustrates the weakening economic role of States and the absence of management 
of a public nature. The second economic constraint on MPA governance concerns 
the growing openness of their economies, which leads to the imposition of a market 
systems logic and the integration of these areas into the globalization process. This 
constraint concerns all rural populations in LDCs, but an approach based on a 
supposedly “indigenous” nature of the populations concerned has often tended to 
play down and even deny the globalization impact on MPA residents.
The analysis of the legal context reveals the international inspiration behind 
the conceptual framework, the objectives and the conservation procedures of 
LDC MPAs. This analysis also leads to the legal definition of an MPA as, in most 
cases, the circumscription of an administered and regulated area. The study of the 
legal context shows that, in most LDCs, state and societal law coexist in these 
protected areas, as they indeed do more broadly in most LDCs where the State 
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and its administration negotiate with the civil society about how the law should 
be applied in order to achieve its objectives. Research undertaken in West Africa 
shows that an MPA is usually the manifestation of a strong legal state control 
of social space clashing with the resurgence of societal rights. This dual nature 
generates a new type of original negotiated law, neither entirely state-based nor 
purely societal, reflecting legal syncretism.
Constraints and legal context are characterizing elements of governance 
systems. However, such characterization requires the adoption of an analytical 
framework that draws on four sources of inspiration: (i) the interactive fisheries 
governance approach largely developed by the Centre for Maritime Research of 
the University of Amsterdam; (ii) the risk governance approach developed by 
TRUSTNET; (iii) the socioanthropology of mediations and brokerage, mainly 
developed by the École des hautes études en sciences sociales; and (iv) the 
governance analytical framework at the initiative of the IUED. The analytical 
framework presented aims to provide the foundation for a comparative approach 
applicable to all governance systems. It points to five essential themes that should 
be explored in order to give operational content to the governance concept:
% definition of governance problems;
% description of the norms with which governance should comply;
% classification of the governance actors;
% identification of the nodal points where actors’ strategies clash;
% reconstruction of the process that led to the current governance system.
This analytical framework makes it possible to characterize the different MPA 
governance systems in LDCs. It has been applied to the two most important 
West African coastal and marine protected areas: the Banc d’Arguin National 
Park in Mauritania; and the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve in 
Guinea-Bissau. Two governance systems have been identified: a hierarchical and 
instrumentalized system; and a community-based concession system.
The governance system of the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve 
is based on the devolution of regulatory powers concerning resource access and 
use to traditional institutions belonging to the social organization of Bijogo 
society. This community-based concession system, based on the prevailing mutual 
trust paradigm, is encouraged by the authorities, insofar as a land law recognizes 
and ratifies all the traditional rights but no higher authority guarantees its public 
nature. This highlights the main deficiency of this governance system: the lack of 
resources of traditional institutions to exercise control over the maritime territory 
together with the weakness of the linkages between traditional and state powers. 
To remedy this weakness, norms for resource access and use could be jointly 
established by the residents and the State. Such cooperation could be supported 
by international NGOs and institutions that have the capacity to generate the 
necessary mechanisms.
The Banc d’Arguin National Park is an example of an MPA where governance is 
very strongly influenced by tribal affiliation. The strategic actors, who are the tribal 
faction chiefs or their representatives, contract obligations and make decisions in 
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the name of others, placing their authority within the tribal framework. However, 
the State has the final say, especially when tribal conciliation fails. Therefore, 
the administration is tempted to operate according to the prevailing top-down 
paradigm, the only one it really “masters”, but it often runs up against the weight 
of networks of influence and counterbalancing powers of tribal and regional 
origin that give the administration (more or less covertly) some of its legitimacy. 
In particular, the Imraguen populations claim the “compensations” to which 
they would be entitled given their loss of earnings owing to statutory constraints 
enacted by the administration. The arguments of legitimization or justification 
used by these actors reveal divergences, convey antagonisms, and mobilize 
support, which gives the governance system of the Banc d’Arguin National Park 
its specificity: a hierarchical and instrumentalized governance system.
The characterization of governance systems highlights their weaknesses, 
facilitating suggestions about how to restructure governance and the proposal of 
new public policy options. The main weaknesses concern: the limits of conventional 
fisheries management; the lack of financial sustainability; the disproportionate role 
of international NGOs and institutions; an incomplete decentralization process; 
and the fragmentation of the State and civil society.
The formulation of problems in conventional fisheries management terms 
does not promote the analysis of the various actors’ practices and interests, and 
this leads to little or no compliance with the fishery management restrictions. In 
LDCs, MPA governance is also hampered by the poor, unstable and unsustainable 
nature of their funding; the best guarantors of long-term funding are international 
assistance agencies, debt swaps and trust funds as well as an increase in entrance 
fees, licences and permits. The disproportionate role of international NGOs 
and institutions must be mentioned. These groups can be seen as eroding the 
regulatory power of the State rather than strengthening the public management of 
these areas. Incomplete decentralization is another weakness of MPA governance 
in LDCs. It manifests itself in the fact that local authorities have few or no fiscal 
prerogatives in the protected areas. Finally, the fragmentation of the State and civil 
society hinders local governance of MPAs – the former leads to compartmentalized 
international aid projects and coordination problems between deconcentrated 
administrative services within the protected areas; the latter is illustrated by 
the multiplication of associations, producer groups and local NGOs with very 
diverse and essentially irreconcilable objectives that undermines the efficacy of the 
concertation mechanisms.
Restructuring MPA governance in LDCs is essential in order to alleviate its 
current weaknesses. The two stages needed might be: (i) formalize law-based 
governance; and (ii) transform the way in which governance functions. Finally, 
restructuring governance should enable protected areas to become a strategic tool 
of national environmental policies.
Formalizing law-based governance can be achieved through the creation 
of coordination structures and the rehabilitation of “lead” administrations, 
which implies that state authorities recover their legitimacy by simplifying their 
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administrative processes, improving transparency and developing their functions. 
Formalizing law-based governance within the framework of the emergence of civil 
society must promote the participation of the residents of these protected areas in 
decision-making and public management.
Transforming the way that MPAs in LDCs function requires adapting their 
legal and institutional statuses and simultaneously adapting the means of action. 
Adapting the legal and institutional statuses aims at breaking down the barriers 
between conservation and socio-economic development. It consists, first of all, in 
establishing and implementing regulatory texts and decrees relating to economic 
control rules. Three actions can be distinguished. The first is to update the notion 
of “traditional fishing”, seasonal access rules and the regulation of trading activities 
and artisanal processing. The second is to redefine the role of cooperatives, 
producer groups and associations in order to extend their responsibilities in the 
organization of production and marketing. The third is the creation of socio-
economic observatories to help improve the assessment of the systems’ capacity 
to adapt to conservation constraints on the production and the value enhancement 
of natural resources and, more generally, to advance understanding of social 
dynamics so as to better guide ongoing and future conservation projects.
Adapting the means of action requires that decentralization processes, currently 
incomplete, be finalized. To compensate for the fact that the process remains 
unfinished, residents’ local authorities should be allocated their own fiscal 
resources, and genuine administrative deconcentration should be undertaken. The 
completion of the decentralization and deconcentration process should contribute 
to removing a major obstacle, i.e. the weak relations between residents of these 
protected areas and the deconcentrated services. However, adapting means of 
action also requires the recognition and the guarantee of territorial-use rights in 
line with the recommendations of international conferences. Concession models, 
in the legal sense of the term, seem the most appropriate to the notion of territory 
building in the protected space. Concession gives territorial-use rights a double 
(State and traditional) legitimacy so that beneficiary communities may legally 
exercise their rights over a territory against non-qualified external actors. The 
interest of a concession is to establish community discipline in return for the 
acquisition of new rights under the conditions set out in the area specifications or 
in a code of conduct.
By transforming the way MPAs function in LDCs, this restructuring of 
governance should enable protected areas to become a strategic tool of national 
environmental policies. Integrating conservation projects into other sectoral 
policies requires that they be considered a part of a wider public policy and that 
the strong social and economic dynamics that characterize them are taken into 
account. These dynamics result in the MPA situation evolving continuously, 
and this, in turn, would cause a transformation in how the State functions that is 
favourable to mutations in both the law and the institutions.
A specific option of environmental public policy, ecotourism development, 
is often presented as an alternative and a viable complement to traditional 
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activities, especially given the great potential offered by the rich fauna and flora 
of these protected areas. However, this overview of West African coastal and 
marine protected areas reveals more or less serious weaknesses in the planning, 
integration and organization of ecotourism, and leads to the recommendation that 
its development should be community-based. Depending on the protected area, 
the assessment leads to stressing either the modalities for ecotourism community 
development, planning and comanagement or integration into the prevailing 
tourism pattern.
More generally, MPA governance in LDCs is hampered by the absence of 
a system to monitor public actions and policies, and this contributes to the 
weaknesses observed. However, the World Commission on Protected Areas 
has identified monitoring as one of eight critical factors in MPA performance. 
It questioned, on the one hand, the modalities for monitoring and assessing the 
efficiency of biodiversity conservation and management efforts in situ and, on the 
other hand, the modalities for communicating this information to citizens and 
public decision-makers. Data should be collected regularly and processed in order 
to show the true efforts deployed in management and their efficacy in terms of 
achieving objectives concerning ecosystem conservation and the improvement of 
the well-being of the local population.
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This document is a synthesis of Les aires marines protégées d’Afrique de l’Ouest. 
Gouvernance et politiques publiques (Weigel et. al, 2007) which proposes an analytical 
framework to study the governance of MPAs in the LDCs, drawing on four sources of 
inspiration: (i) the interactive fisheries governance approach; (ii) the risk governance 
approach; (iii) the socioanthropology of mediations and brokerage; and (iv) the governance 
analytical framework. The framework indicates the five issues that must be addressed in 
order to operationalize the concept of governance in LDC MPAs: (i) definition of the 
problem or the issue at stake; (ii) identification of the set of relevant governance norms; 
(iii) presentation of the actors involved in the governance process; (iv) highlighting the 
nodes around which actors’ strategies converge; and (v) recalling the processes that have led 
to the current state of governance. This analytical framework makes it possible to 
characterize the governance system of each of the MPAs considered and to develop a 
typology of these systems. The characterization of different governance systems highlights 
their weaknesses and paves the way for new public policy options and, more generally, for 
the restructuring of governance to correct these weaknesses.
In order to develop an analytical framework and the characterization of governance systems 
the main MPA governance principles and constraints, as well their legal context, were 
clarified. This was done by testing the proposed methodology in three West African coastal 
and marine protected areas, which illustrated the difficulties of governance in LDCs: the 
Banc d’Arguin National Park in Mauritania, the Saloum Delta Biosphere Reserve in Senegal, 
and the Bolama Bijagos Archipelago Biosphere Reserve in Guinea-Bissau. The analysis of 
demographic and economic constraints in these West African MPAs showed the importance 
of: (i) increasing population density and mobility; (ii) the intensification of resource 
exploitation; and (iii) and the opening of the MPA economy. The analysis of the legal and 
institutional contexts showed the international inspiration of the MPA objectives and 
conservation arrangements, and the syncretism of the legal system. 
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